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Limited War Theory: Origin and Growth 
 
British military historian and strategist Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart was the first to propound the idea of 
“limiting” wars when World War II was at its peak. He is considered “the apostle of limited war,” but his 
arguments for limiting wars were different from those that were advocated in the mid-1950s in the United 
States.1 According to Liddell Hart, “the more ‘total’ the war became, the greater the risk that ‘freedom’ would 
be permanently lost.”2 
Liddell Hart was not advocating limited war as a strategy, but was arguing that the wars should be limited. 
Two specific developments forced Liddell Hart to argue for limiting war. The first were the advancements in 
“automatic warfare,” which he believed is far more destructive than earlier forms of war.3 For him, 
The advent of “automatic warfare” should make plain the absurdity of warfare as a means of deciding 
nations’ claims to superiority…They can no longer claim that war is any test of people’s fitness, or 
even its national strength. Science has undermined the foundations of nationalism, at the very time 
when the spirit of nationalism is most rampant.4 
Second, there was the development of atomic weapons. Liddell Hart believed that “where both sides 
possess atomic power, total warfare makes nonsense” and any unlimited war “waged with atomic power would 
make worse than nonsense: it would be mutually suicidal.”5 He believed that there would be no victory to any 
side in an era where the use of atomic weapons was being contemplated. According to him, any total war, or 
“even the preparation for it, is likely to carry more evils in its train, without bearing any good promise in the 
event of victory.”6 
Liddell Hart wanted to “revive a code of limiting rules for warfare—based on a realistic view that wars are 
likely to occur again, and that the limitation of their destructiveness is to everybody’s interest.”7 However, the 
arguments favoring limited war in the 1950s had different perceptions. In fact, the very definition of limited war 
underwent a considerable change in the 1950s. 
Defining Limited War 
What is limited war? What makes strategists consider a war “limited?” 
A cursory look at the available definitions reveals not only the differences in perceptions of limited war but 
also the narrowness of their applicability. Invariably, the existing literature on the subject is written in the West, 
especially in the United States. The principal focus of the definitions seems to be on “almost any military action 
that does not threaten the immediate destruction of the United States and the NATO powers, on the one hand, 
and the Soviet Union (including its Eastern Empire) and Communist China, on the other.”8 Limited war is 
defined as: 
One in which the belligerents restrict the purposes for which they fight to concrete, well defined 
objectives that do not demand the utmost military effort of which the belligerents are capable and that 
can be accommodated in a negotiated settlement...The battle is confined to a local geographical area 
                                                           
1 Robert H. Larson, “B.H. Liddell Hart: Apostle of Limited War,” Military Affairs 44, no. 2 (April 1980): 70-74. 
2 Brian Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1977), 126. 
3 By “automatic warfare,” Liddell Hart meant the scientific development in the field of pilotless planes, which he called 
“flying bombs,” and long-range rockets, which according to him have torn away the “veil of illusion that had so long 
obscured the reality of change in warfare—from a fight to a process of devastation. Being palpably ‘inhuman’ instruments, 
they inspired the feeling—which counts more than a truth apprehended by reason—that war is no longer a matter of 
fighting.” See B.H. Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1947), 36. 
4 Hart, The Revolution in Warfare, 37. 
5 Ibid., 99. 
6 Liddell Hart, quoted in Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought, 164. 
7 Hart, The Revolution in Warfare, 114. 
8 Seymour J. Deitchman, Limited War and American Defense Policy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1964), 13. 
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and directed against selected targets—primarily those of direct military importance. It demands of the 
belligerents only a fractional commitment of their human and physical resources. It permits their 
economic, social and political patterns of existence to continue without serious disruption.9  
Limited wars “were to be fought for ends far short of the complete subordination of one state’s will to 
another’s using means that involve far less than the total military resources of the belligerents and leave the 
civilian life and the armed forces of the belligerents largely intact.”10 
It meant that “either the ends or means, or both, are limited in the conflict.”11 Limited war is also defined as 
a “military encounter” in which the two warring sides “see each other on opposing sides and in which the effort 
of each falls short of the attempt to use all of its power to destroy the other.”12 
It may be a “war confined to a defined geographic area, or war that does not utilize the entire available 
weapons system (such as refraining from the use of thermonuclear weapons). It may be a war which utilizes the 
entire weapons system but it limits its employment to specific targets. But none of these military definitions 
seems adequate…In short, there exists no way to define a limited war in purely military terms.”13 
Based on the above definitions, a limited war involves the following: 
• Military confrontation between two belligerents with concrete and well-defined objectives 
• Both belligerents believe that such a military confrontation can be confined geographically and have 
minimal impact on civilians 
• Such a military confrontation does not demand maximum military efforts 
Limited War: Origin and Growth 
The current perception of limited war originated during the cold war.14 Amongst the two main actors of the cold 
war, it was in the United States that the concept of limited war became prominent as a political and military 
strategy vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union. Though the concept of limited war originated mainly as a limited 
conventional war in the 1950s and ‘60s, it expanded to include limited nuclear war in the 1970s. 
Limited war as a theory evolved both as an offensive and defensive strategy to protect the strategic interests 
of the United States. As an offensive strategy, limited war was part of the US strategy to deal with the Soviet 
Union; as a defensive strategy, it aimed to protect the interests of the United States and its allies, especially in 
Europe.  
Replacing Maximum Retaliation 
In the 1950s, with the ascendancy of weapons of mass destruction and the decline of political use of war as an 
instrument, the United States was searching for a new strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The question was: 
how to deter the Soviet Union, which had already broken the nuclear monopoly of the United States and 
“acquired a significant nuclear armory and the capacity to retaliate against the Unites States homeland?”15 The 
first major strategy was that of massive retaliation. By the mid 1950s, even while the strategy of massive 
                                                           
9 Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), 
1-2. 
10 Robert E. Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 3.  
11 Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994), 16. 
12 Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1963), 2. 
13 Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1957), 139. 
14 See the following: Deitchman, Limited War and American Defense Policy; Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age; 
Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy; Osgood, Limited War Revisited. 
15 John Garnett, “Limited War,” in Contemporary Strategy: Theory and Practice, eds. John Baylis et al. (New York: Holmes 
& Meier Publishers, 1975), 115. 
Limited War with Pakistan 3 
  
retaliation evolved, Bernard Brodie and William Kaufmann refuted the utility of massive retaliation as a 
strategy to deal with the Soviet Union.16 Writing in 1956, Kaufmann observed: 
It is by no means clear, even now, that we can destroy the centers of Soviet or Chinese power without 
having a similar catastrophe visited upon us; and certainly within a very short time we will have to 
accept the idea of parity of capabilities for mutual extinction.17 
Henry Kissinger was one of the first strategists to understand this growing dilemma related to weapons of 
mass destruction and their political and military implications in case of an all-out war. He wrote in 1957,  
As the power of modern weapons grows, the threat of all-out war loses its credibility and therefore its 
political effectiveness. Our capacity for massive retaliation did not avert the Korean War, the loss of 
northern Indo-China, the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, or the Suez crisis. A deterrent which one is afraid 
to implement when it is challenged ceases to be a deterrent.18 
The main question that faced strategists was: What if the strategies of massive conventional or nuclear 
retaliation or threats of its use fail to deter the adversary? By the second half of the 1950s, US strategists 
realized that with the presence of nuclear weapons within the United States, the threat of using them as a part of 
their massive retaliation strategy failed to achieve US objectives. Kissinger, who led the school of thought 
against the strategy of massive retaliation argued, 
Every increase in destructiveness is purchased at the price of reduced credibility of the retaliatory 
threat. In this vicious circle, deterrence may fail. If it does, the reliance on massive retaliation will not 
guarantee the direct outcome. It will lead either to surrender or to the most catastrophic form of war.19 
The existing strategy was not working; hence a new strategy was needed to achieve US strategic objectives 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. 
In Kissinger’s words, such a strategy should enable the United States “to avoid the dilemma of having a 
choice between all-out war and a gradual loss of positions, between Armageddon and defeat without war.”20 It 
was under these conditions that limited wars were seen as possessing a “number of other virtues,” though “they 
may not be adequate substitutes for victory.”21 
The virtues of a limited war were explained by Kaufmann: 
They enable us to escape from having to choose between retreat and the nuclear holocaust. They 
preserve us from the revolutionary and disorienting charges that are the products of great wars. They 
offer the prospect of bringing military means and policy aims into much closer relationship than they 
have enjoyed for many years. And limited warfare affords all these benefits, not at a trifling cost by 
any manner of any means, but at a cost far smaller than a modern nuclear conflict would entail.22 
The “Twin Fears” 
Limited war as a defensive strategy arose to defend the interests of the United States and those of its allies 
against what Robert Osgood calls the “twin fears.”23 According to him,  
The United States and to lesser degrees major US democratic allies (except where they were directly 
involved) feared that local wars might become instruments of communist expansion that could not be 
contained; indigenous local resistance would be inadequate, and US intervention would either be 
ineffective in shoring up weak governments or entail too big a risk of Soviet or Chinese counter 
intervention and nuclear war. Second there was also the fear that US nuclear forces might prove an 
                                                           
16 See Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959); William W. 
Kaufmann, “Limited Warfare,” in Military Policy and National Security, eds. William W. Kaufmann et al. (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1956), 102-136 
17 Kaufmann, “Limited Warfare,” 106. 
18 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 134. 
19 Henry Kissinger, The Necessity of Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy (New York: Anchor Books, 1962), 59. 
20 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 136. 
21 Kaufmann, “Limited Warfare,” 106. 
22 Ibid., 107. 
23 Osgood, Limited War Revisited, 5. 
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ineffective deterrent; the growth of the Soviet capacity to devastate the Unites States and its allies 
would erode the credibility of the US nuclear intervention or retaliation.24  
Maintaining US credibility in Europe was a critical component of the limited war strategy. How credible 
was the US support to its allies in case of a Soviet attack in Europe? Should the United States be willing to risk 
the lives of Americans or cities such as Chicago or New York in return for an attack carried out in Europe? John 
Garnett phrased the European dilemma eloquently: “threatening the Soviet Union with massive retaliation even 
for a relatively minor aggression in Europe lacked all credibility when the consequences of implementing the 
threat were likely to result in the complete destruction of the American way of life.” He quoted French General 
Pierre-Marie Gallois: “No nation can be expected to commit suicide for the sake of another.”25 
The strategic parity that the Soviet Union acquired with the United States, in terms of the “Soviet capacity 
to devastate the United States with nuclear weapons” and the fear of erosion of the US ability to “use nuclear 
weapons to protect even its important allies, if they could not be protected conventionally”26 became two main 
reasons for the origin of the concept of limited war.  
Objectives of Limited War 
What are the objectives of a limited war? Who defines these objectives? Are they limited or unlimited? And, 
how limited can these objectives be? 
According to Kissinger, a limited war “is fought for specific political objectives, which by their existence, 
tend to establish a relationship between the force employed and the goal to be attained. It reflects an attempt to 
affect the opponent’s will not to crush it, to make the conditions imposed seem more attractive than continued 
resistance, to strive for specific goals and not for complete annihilation.”27 And these objectives should be 
minimal and “hold the conflict within the desired limits.”28  
Morton Halperin believed that the United States and the Soviet Union could fight a limited war for three 
objectives—basic foreign policy objectives, political-effects objectives, and battlefield objectives.29 
Foreign Policy Political Objectives 
The first political objective was the protection of US interests, especially in Europe. As mentioned earlier, US 
allies in Europe needed to be assured of the utility and effectiveness of US strategy. Any negative impact on this 
would have a demonstrative effect in other parts of the world and would erode US influence.  
Second in importance was the prevention of Soviet influence over other communist and non-communist 
countries. When the cold war began, containing the Soviet Union was the main issue before the US policy 
makers. While some preferred massive retaliation, others preferred limited retaliation. Giving three reasons for 
developing a strategy of limited war, Kissinger wrote in 1957, “First, limited war represents the only means for 
preventing the Soviet bloc, at an acceptable cost, from overrunning the peripheral areas of Eurasia.”30 
Accordingly, it was believed that a limited war strategy, more than a threat of total nuclear war, was likely to 
contain the Soviet Union.  
Third, besides containing the Soviet Union, it was also believed that a limited war would also break the 
monolithic nature of the Soviet bloc. Kissinger forecasted,  
The USSR may be forced to loosen its hold on its European satellites if it finds that the effort to hold 
them in line absorbs even more of its strength. And relations between China and the Soviet Union may 
become cooler if the alliance forces either partner to shoulder risks for objectives which are of no 
                                                           
24 Ibid., 4-5. 
25 Garnett, “Limited War,” 116. 
26 Osgood, Limited War Revisited, 15. 
27 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 140. 
28 Kaufmann, “Limited Warfare,” 113. 
29 Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age, 3. 
30 The other two reasons according to him are that “a wide range of military capabilities may spell the difference between 
defeat and victory even in all-out war. Finally, intermediate applications of our power offer the best chance to bring about 
strategic changes favorable to our side.” Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 147. 
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benefit to it. Tito’s break with Moscow was caused at least in part by his disenchantment over the 
Soviet Union’s lukewarm support on the Trieste issue, and that in turn was due to the unwillingness of 
the Kremlin to risk an all-out war for the sake of peripheral objective. Similarly it is not clear how 
much China would risk to rescue the USSR from embarrassments in Europe or in the Middle East, or 
to what lengths the USSR is prepared to go to increase the power of China in Asia.31  
Fourth, it was believed that a limited war would have a demonstration effect. The side that is willing to risk 
a limited war aims to demonstrate its seriousness to its adversary and the actual use of force or the threat of use 
of force is primarily to prove that it would not hesitate to use force to secure its objectives. The threat of force 
by the United States during the Cuban missile crisis is considered as an example for such a motivation. The 
United States was “partly motivated by the feeling that it was important to use force and risk a nuclear war in 
order to secure its objectives. The United States acted to convince Khrushchev that the Kennedy administration 
was not too liberal to fight when it felt its rights were threatened.” Besides proving a point to the adversary, the 
demonstration effect also must take into account other countries in the region where the limited war is planned. 
It was believed that “the manner in which the United States responds to Communist aggression in Indo-China, 
for example, affects the orientation of Thailand, the Philippines, and other Asian nations.”32 
Fifth, it was believed that limited wars were essential for ensuring that deterrence could actually work. 
Kissinger, a leading exponent of this argument, considered “the purpose of a strategy of limited war is first, to 
strengthen deterrence and second, if deterrence should fail, to provide an opportunity for settlement before the 
automatism of the retaliatory forces takes over.”33 The argument is two fold. One, limited war enhances 
deterrence. Two, if deterrence fails, limited war then “provides another opportunity for both sides to prevent a 
catastrophe.”34 
According to Kissinger, “deterrence is greatest when military strength is coupled with the willingness to 
employ it. It is achieved when one side’s readiness to run risks in retaliation to the other is high; it is least 
effective when the willingness to run risks is low, no matter how powerful the military capability.”35 The belief 
then was that the presence of strategic weapons, including nuclear ones, need not necessarily bring deterrence; 
rather, it was the threat or the actual use of force that would deter the adversary. Therefore, deterrence needed to 
be “supplemented” by another strategy, otherwise the “Western alliance could fall victim to Soviet salami 
tactics—a series of hostile acts which, considered individually, were not sufficiently serious to justify massive 
retaliation.”36 
Kissinger links deterrence with limited war. In his later work, he makes this linkage explicit: “A strategy of 
limited war would seek to achieve deterrence not so much through the threat of devastation but through 
depriving the aggressor of the possibility of gaining his objective.”37  
The main issue was how to make the adversary believe that one is serious and how to convince its political 
leadership that one could use force, though it might lead to a stalemate. Given this dilemma, the advocates of 
this argument believed “given the power of modern weapons, a nation that relies on all-out war as its chief 
deterrent imposes a fearful psychological handicap on itself. The most agonizing decision a statesman can face 
is whether or not to unleash all-out war; all pressures will make for hesitation, short of a direct attack 
threatening the national existence.”38 
The critics of limited war, however, did not agree with the assumption that limited war would assure 
deterrence. If massive destruction was not the desired objective of such a strategy, either through massive 
retaliation or otherwise, then limited war could induce the states to wage a war. To this extent, limited war was 
seen as dangerous since it undermined, rather than complemented, the deterrence strategy.39 
                                                           
31 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 148. 
32 Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age, 5. 
33 Kissinger, The Necessity of Choice, 61-62. 
34 Ibid., 64. 
35 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 132. 
36 Garnett, “Limited War,” 116. 
37 Kissinger, The Necessity of Choice, 61. 
38 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 133. 
39 Garnett, “Limited War,” 117. 
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Military Objectives: Are There Any? 
Could there be any military objectives in a limited war? What role does the military play in a limited war 
scenario? Kissinger finds that a limited war, being “essentially a limited act,” presents a dilemma to the 
military. The objectives of an all-out war are easy to define as “the limits set by military considerations and 
even by military capacity. The targets for an all-out war are fixed, and the force requirements are determined by 
the need to assemble overwhelming power. The characteristic of a limited war, on the other hand, is the 
existence of ground rules, which define the relationship of military to political objectives.”40 
What role does military power play then in the event of a limited war? Osgood argues that it “should be 
subordinate to national policy” and “the only legitimate purpose of military forces is to serve the nation’s 
political objective.”41 Clearly this is based on the famous dictum of Karl von Clausewitz that “war is nothing 
but a continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other means.”42 
The role of military power is limited, but crucial. If one is to go by Clausewitz’s dictum, then success in a 
war depends on the political utilization of the war and not on defeating the enemy in the battleground. However 
a “measure of military success is the necessary condition for achieving the political objectives of war.”43 
Internal Political Objectives 
Internal political objectives also need to be considered. Once a limited war starts, both sides would be equally 
concerned about the level of domestic support to the war and its eventual outcome. Unlike during a full-fledged 
war, internal support from various political actors—especially the main opposition party and the general 
population—for the limited war would not be spontaneous and not subject to criticism. While the general 
population may like the war to be taken to its logical conclusion of suppression of the enemy forces, they would 
be unwilling to accept any defeat. The pressure then would be on the state, so as not to lose the limited war. It 
was believed in the United States that “the decision to expand a local war will be influenced not only by the 
reactions of other political actors and the American electorate, but also by the major domestic goals of the 
Administration itself, on which its political life also depends.”44  
Limited War: Who Defines the Objectives? 
It is clear that the main objectives of a limited war are political and not military. This partly answers the second 
question raised in the beginning of this section—who defines the objectives of a limited war? Since a limited 
war is not fought for purely military objectives or to arrive at a military solution, the “political leadership 
must…assume the responsibility for defining the framework, within which the military are to develop their 
plans and capabilities. To demand of the military that they set their own limits is to set in motion a vicious 
cycle.”45 
The political leadership should define the objectives of a limited war, since the “whole conduct of 
warfare—its strategy, its tactics, its termination—must be governed by the nature of a nation’s political 
objectives and not by independent standards of military success or glory.”46 Kissinger argues: 
The purpose of limited war is to inflict losses or to pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the 
objectives under dispute. The more moderate the objective, the less violent the war is likely to be. This 
does not mean that the military operations cannot go beyond the territory or the objective in dispute; 
indeed, one way of increasing the enemy’s willingness to settle is to deprive him of something he can 
regain only by making peace.47 
                                                           
40 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 140. 
41 Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, 13. 
42 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. O.J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: The Modern Library, 1943). 
43 Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, 13. 
44 Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age, 25. 
45 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 141. 
46 Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, 22. 
47 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 145. 
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What Limits a Limited War? 
What are the main factors that could have convinced the advocates of limited war to believe that wars could be 
limited? Why should an adversary limit its response in a war when it is not going in its favor? What would limit 
the side that has initiated the conflict, if the limited offensive is not sufficient enough to achieve its initial 
objectives? 
In the event a limited war, it is believed that the strategic interests of the belligerents at the global level 
would keep the conflict limited. Though a limited war would be initiated to achieve some of the above 
mentioned objectives, its expansion would be considered against global interests. Since a limited war is 
considered to be a means to achieve the global objectives, the latter, it is believed, would keep the former from 
escalating.  
Each side will be conscious of the possible impact of a local war on its efforts to reach accommodation 
in other geographic areas or on other problems. In 1954, for example, the Sino-Soviet bloc was about 
to launch a peace offensive which would have been embarrassed by the continuation of expansion of 
war in Indochina. Similarly in 1958 when East and West were beginning to clash over Berlin, they 
were at the same time attempting to negotiate a treaty to ban nuclear tests. The successful conclusion 
of these negotiations would have been highly unlikely in the event of armed conflict on the European 
continent.48 
As long as the wars take place in the periphery, the superpowers would keep the war limited, as there is no 
need to risk a total war. It is believed that the United States kept the war in Korea limited so that it could 
“maintain a favorable posture in the event of a more direct challenge in a more important region.”49 
Second, it is also believed that the “reluctance of the major powers to commit resources that may be 
required to deal with other areas of potential violence or to deter central war”50 would keep the war in a region 
limited. This is based on the belief that there are a number of potential areas all over the world, where a side 
would have to engage the other in a limited conflict, hence spending all its energy in one area is not prudent. 
Both sides are aware of this limitation, hence would not expand the limited war in to a central war. 
Kissinger states that “the restraint which keeps a war limited is a psychological one; the consequences of a 
limited victory or a limited defeat or a stalemate—the three possible outcomes of a limited war—must seem 
preferable to the consequences of an all-out war…Limited war, therefore, involves as many psychological 
complexities as a policy of deterrence.”51 
Third, it is also believed that the cooperation between the two adversaries during a limited war would keep 
the war limited. Adversaries who would otherwise not like to cooperate, and who prefer a limited war, would 
however cooperate during actual conflict, so that it does not escalate. A complicated argument, nevertheless, 
was advanced by Kissinger: 
Limited war is based on a kind of tacit bargain not to exceed certain restraints. One side’s desire to 
keep the war limited is of no avail unless the other side cooperates: it takes two to keep a limited war 
limited or a local defense local.52 
Fourth, the limited war theorists theorized that the dangers of escalation would keep a war limited. 
Kissinger, identifying the contradiction in this argument, argued,  
However paradoxical it may seem, the danger of escalation is one of the chief reasons why a strategy 
of limited war contributes to deterrence and also why, if deterrence fails, there is a chance of keeping a 
conflict limited. A strategy of limited war adds to deterrence for the very reason usually invoked 
against it… One side or both may be willing to accept limited defeat rather than take the initiative in 
breaching the rules and to act in a manner that reassures the other of such willingness. The rules may 
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be respected because if they are once broken, there is no assurance that any new ones can be found and 
jointly recognized in time to check the widening of the conflict.53 
Fifth, geography has an important role to play in limiting the war. The “physical configuration of Korea” 
limited the Korean War, as the “area was surrounded by water, and the principal northern political boundary 
was marked dramatically and unmistakably by a river.”54 
Overcoming the Dangers of Escalation 
The advocates of limited war were aware of the implications of escalation. To overcome escalation, the 
opponents need to be persuaded on numerous aspects. Kaufmann asserted, 
(The enemy) would have to be persuaded that he could not achieve his objectives by the means 
currently being employed. He would also have to be convinced that he could not attain them by 
expanding the war in scope or in weapons. At the same time, within the existing framework of the 
contest, he would have to have it demonstrated that the costs of fighting to him outweighed the costs to 
the United States, and consequently that the advantages of terminating the conflict were greater than 
the advantages of continuing it.55 
Halperin identified two kinds of escalation—inadvertent and deliberate.56 Forces and events of war may 
spin out of control, ultimately leading to escalation, which is inadvertent. On the other hand, the side that may 
be losing could deliberately escalate the conflict, so as to avoid the defeat at the battlefield. “Not only may an 
adversary balk at giving signs of eagerness to come to agreement; it is even possible that one side in a potential 
war may have a tactical interest in keeping that war unrestrained and aggravating the likelihood of mutual 
destruction in case it comes.”57 
How is a war kept limited? Or what would keep a war limited between two sides and make sure that it is 
not escalated—either inadvertently or deliberately? What kept the Soviet Union and the United States from 
escalating the numerous local conflicts that took place between them? 
According to Kissinger, limited war “presupposes three conditions: the ability to generate pressures other 
than the threat of all-out war; the ability to create a climate in which survival is not thought to be at stake in 
each issue; and the ability to keep control of public opinion in case a disagreement arises over whether national 
survival is at stake.”58 
The following are essential to overcome the dangers of escalation in a limited war scenario: limited 
objectives and a strategic doctrine, strategic parity, strategic stability, and strategic communication. 
Limited Objectives and Strategic Doctrine 
One essential aspect of keeping war limited is to have the objectives limited. Bernard Brodie calls this 
“deliberate restraint.”59 Any unlimited objectives or objectives aiming at total destruction of the adversary—
both politically and militarily—would escalate a limited war. Any attempt to “reduce the enemy to impotence 
would remove the psychological balance which makes it profitable for both sides to keep the war limited. Faced 
with the ultimate threat of complete defeat, the losing side may seek to deprive its opponent of the margin to 
impose his will by unleashing a thermonuclear holocaust.”60  
It is essential for the party that initiates the limited war to keep in mind its aim of limited victories—
victories that are relative and not absolute. An absolute victory between two equal adversaries is impossible, 
given the ability to destroy the other completely and convincingly in any war scenario. Likewise, an absolute 
loss is impossible, given the ability to protect oneself from total destruction. Since neither total victory nor total 
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loss is a likely outcome in any war situation, both sides should be willing to accept limited victory or limited 
failure.  
To keep a war limited, then, the “deliberate restraint” must be “massive.” For example, it should avoid 
strategic bombing of cities with nuclear weapons.61 But how can the bombing be strategic, if the cities are to be 
avoided in a limited war scenario? Brodie explains the paradox: 
Limited war might conceivably include strategic bombing carried on in a selective or otherwise limited 
manner, for example bombing with nuclear weapons on selected targets such as airfields while being 
as careful as possible not to hit cities. It is certainly conceivable that strategic bombing could be carried 
on in a restrained and discriminatory fashion.62 
Limited war “cannot be a means of bringing about a radical alteration in the distribution of power; that 
would be a contradiction in terms. Nor can it be a method of obtaining overwhelmingly favorable resolutions of 
outstanding issues.”63 Limited war should aim at limited victory and “the terms must be short of unconditional 
surrender and give the vanquished a chance to negotiate on a reasonable basis.”64 
Kissinger explains the importance of a limited victory-limited failure outcome: “Limited war should not be 
considered a cheaper method of imposing unconditional surrender but an opportunity for another attempt to 
prevent a final showdown. We must enter it prepared to negotiate and to settle for something less that our 
traditional notion of complete victory.”65 Elsewhere he writes, “The concept of limited war and the diplomacy 
appropriate to it reflect the fact that in the nuclear age the possibility of total solutions no longer exists.”66 
Besides limiting the objectives, it is also essential to convey to the other side, both explicitly and implicitly, 
that the side that initiates the conflict does not intend to escalate the conflict into an all-out war. Diplomacy 
plays a vital role here, once the limited conflict has begun or is about to begin.  
Kissinger considered diplomacy the third necessary prerequisite of a limited war strategy.67 In one article, 
Kissinger argued, 
Even a unilateral declaration of what we understand by limited war would accomplish a great deal 
because it would provide a strong incentive to the Soviet Union to adopt a similar interpretation.68 
Strategic Parity  
For both sides not to escalate in a limited war scenario, it is essential that both sides have strategic parity, in 
terms of strategic weapons, deployment of troops, and even in terms of strategies. Both sides should be aware 
that an escalation would hurt them equally in economic, political, and strategic terms.  
Is a limited war possible between adversaries that have no strategic parity? In such a scenario, a war 
between them would always be limited. The stronger side is unlikely to use its full might to completely 
annihilate the weaker side. A war between a stronger and weaker power, either at the global or regional level 
would always be limited from one side, though it may appear unlimited from the other side. A war between the 
United States and Cuba or between India and Bangladesh is always likely to be limited. 
Though theoretically it is possible that the weaker side uses all its forces and prepares for a total 
annihilation of itself against a stronger side, historically such a war has never taken place. The weaker side has 
always acknowledged the superiority of the stronger side sooner or later and brought an end to the war. The 
rhetoric of fighting until the last man standing has actually never taken place. Neither are there examples in the 
recent past that suggest that a stronger side wished for total annihilation of its weaker adversary.  
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Strategic Stability 
Can a limited war take place between two adversaries who have strategic parity but no strategic stability? 
Limited war theorists like Halperin believe that limited war can take place even during periods of strategic 
instability. According to them, “Should a local war occur in a period of strategic instability, both of the major 
powers will probably seek to minimize their stake in the war so that no outcome will appear to affect their basic 
relationship in ways that make the dangers of an explosion more likely...With both sides alert to the danger of 
inducing a preemptive attack, the local war is likely to remain at low key while both sides refrain from 
expansionist actions such as the introduction of nuclear weapons or the crossing of an international border 
which will heighten the tension and the expectations that an explosion is imminent.”69 
Halperin also believes that an “unstable strategic balance is also likely to provide profitable payoffs for a 
side willing to take risks. Faced with a fait accompli, the defending side is likely to be inhibited from joining the 
battle in a situation of unstable deterrence. Thus, if local military action does not lead to preemption, it is also 
not likely to lead to intervention. An unstable strategic balance, then, is likely to reduce the danger of local war 
and central war by expansion, if both sides act cautiously.”70 
Strategic Communication 
It is also essential to communicate to the other side the extent to which one would go in a limited war situation. 
Communication is an essential prerequisite to keep war limited; the lack of it could expand a conflict.71  
Why should the belligerents communicate? It is believed “the greater the costs and risks of a military 
measure, actual or contemplated, the greater the tendency for the men at the higher levels of government to talk 
and act as if they were guided by the academic theory of limited war.”72 Communication is essential off the 
battlefield, as the opponent “must be given to understand what constitutes the risks of changing the rules of the 
game and what are the conditions of terminating the conflict.”73 
Communication is also essential to make the opponent understand the limited objectives of the other side in 
a limited war situation. The failure to convey this message would in fact escalate the conflict. If side A believes 
that the objective of B, which has initiated the conflict, are more than what B actually has in mind, then A 
would retaliate more then what B had expected. Since B was not planning to use much force initially and since 
A is involved in a response that would negate the objectives of B, B would also be forced to increase the 
conflict level.  
Communication also has a “symbolic” value during a conflict situation, for “it signifies both a reluctance to 
permit the conflict to get out of hand and a willingness always to consider a settlement of the dispute.”74 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union, irrespective of the cold war, kept the communication channels 
open and were engaged throughout at different levels. Both superpowers were “engaged in a continuous series 
of interdependent exchanges, in which the stakes, i.e, payoffs, and the moves of players are defined by their 
mutually expected behavior in pursuit of shared and conflicting values and interests.”75 Irrespective of their 
differences and conditions of “imperfect conditions,” both superpowers were willing to “coordinate their moves 
for mutual, if not equal, advantage.”76 
In retrospect, the cold war was also viewed as cooperation, especially on regional relations. Edward A. 
Kolodziej comments that he was  
…struck by the number, variety, and accumulation of understandings, some explicit but more 
frequently tacit, that have been relied upon by elites in Moscow and Washington in shaping their 
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initiatives and responses to the behavior and policies of their rivals and in managing their mutual 
conflicts.77 
It would even be better if the adversaries have a clear military doctrine, which is communicated to the other 
side, so that there is no inadvertent escalation in case of a limited war. However, Halperin argues that such a 
clear military doctrine is not an essential prerequisite for a limited war. According to him, “prior to 1957, the 
United States had no such doctrine and yet it engaged in a number of limited military encounters, including the 
Korean War. Little is known about esoteric Soviet doctrine on local wars...Certainly there has been no explicit 
exchange of attitudes between the United States and the Soviet Union on the possibility of limiting local 
wars.”78 
The Primacy of Politics and a Limited Role for the Military 
The main objective of a limited war should be political and not military, if escalation is to be kept under check. 
Consequently, the decisions should be made by the political leadership and not by the military.  
What role should the military play? According to Stephen Rosen, “The military should not be given a free 
hand, but they must be allowed the freedom to solve the military problem within the limits set for them. The 
military will be able to begin solving the problem only after it receives meaningful instructions and parameters. 
The military itself should be staffed at the highest levels with men who have demonstrated the ability to 
command and adapt to difficult circumstances in combat and who are respected for that ability within the 
army.”79 
To conclude, limited war as a strategy in the US security calculus emerged during the 1950s primarily as an 
alternative to massive retaliation. Since an all-out war could neither be fought nor won during the cold war, the 
strategists in the United States perceived limited war as an answer in their country’s search for a new strategy 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. 
Second, the concept of limited war emerged mainly as an instrument of securing US political interests, 
mainly in terms of preventing the spread of Soviet influence outside Eastern Europe and breaking the 
monolithic nature of the Soviet bloc. There were little or no military objectives in limited war scenarios. 
Third, it was believed that the strategic interests of the superpowers at the global level, reluctance to 
commit all the resources in one area where the limited war was to take place, dangers of escalation, and limited 
cooperation amongst the adversaries would keep the war limited. 
Finally, strategic parity, strategic stability, and strategic communication were seen as three crucial factors 
in any limited war situation. 
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In Search of a New Strategy? 
 
The idea of India engaging in a limited war with Pakistan evolved following the Kargil conflict in 1998. Why 
did such a concept emerge? What are the main arguments for the utility of limited war advanced by its 
advocates?   
Although the concept of a limited war between India and Pakistan gathered momentum in the post-Kargil 
conflict period, the idea is not new. Since the 1980s, there have been a number of inferences to its possibility on 
the subcontinent. Though India has been advocating it since the late 1990s, and Pakistan rejecting it, ironically 
it is Pakistan that first floated the concept in the 1980s.  
Limited War with Pakistan: Looking for a New Strategy 
As in the case of the United States versus the Soviet Union during the 1950s, the idea of limited war gained 
currency while Indian defense planners were scouting for a new strategy to deal with Pakistan in the post-Kargil 
security environment. Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes, while explaining the doctrine of limited war, 
argued for the need for a new policy: 
India has traditionally pursued a non-aggressive, non-provocative defence policy based on the 
philosophy of defensive defence. This represents the political doctrine of employing military power. 
But military efficiency will continue to demand the pursuit of the principle that “offence is the best 
means of defence.”1 
Since the 1990s, India’s political efforts to secure peace with Pakistan failed to make any major 
breakthroughs, despite occasional promising developments. Inside Jammu and Kashmir, though the intensity of 
militancy waxed and waned, peace still remained distant, irrespective of elections for state and national 
legislative assemblies.  
Three major factors in the late 1990s aided the emergence of limited war as a strategy to deal with Pakistan. 
First was the failure of any sustained political dialogue with Pakistan, leading to an acceptable compromise on 
all issues including Jammu and Kashmir. Second was the emergence of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir and 
its continuance, irrespective of India’s efforts to combat it. Third was the Kargil War itself, which was 
perceived by a section in India as a limited war under the nuclear umbrella. 
Failure of Political Dialogue 
The idea of limited war became prominent after the failure by India to reach any political understanding with 
Pakistan. There were meetings at the foreign secretary level, summits between the prime ministers of India and 
Pakistan, secret meetings between the emissaries of the two governments, numerous confidence and security 
building measures, and many attempts at the track-II level. 
Between 1989 and 1998, there were twelve rounds of talks at the foreign secretary level and two rounds of 
talks by the prime ministers, besides numerous meetings at other levels.2 Of particular importance was the 
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Table 2.1: Meetings between the Prime Minister of India and the Prime Minister/President of Pakistan 
since 1972 
 
Date Venue India Pakistan Occasion/Outcome 
July 1972 Simla Indira Gandhi Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto 
Simla Agreement 
31 Aug 1978 Nairobi Morarji Desai Zia ul-Haq Jomo Kenyatta’s funeral 
18 Apr 1980 Salisbury Indira Gandhi Zia ul-Haq Zimbabwe’s independence 
01 Nov 1982 New Delhi Indira Gandhi Zia ul-Haq Decision to establish a Indo-Pak 
Joint Commission 
10 Mar 1983 New Delhi Indira Gandhi Zia ul-Haq 7th NAM Summit 
04 Nov 1984 New Delhi Rajiv Gandhi Zia ul-Haq Indira Gandhi’s funeral 
13 Mar 1985 Moscow Rajiv Gandhi Zia ul-Haq Konstantin Chernenko’s funeral 
23 Oct 1985 New York Rajiv Gandhi Zia ul-Haq UN General Assembly Meeting 
18 Nov 1985 Oman Rajiv Gandhi Zia ul-Haq Oman’s 10th anniversary 
07 Dec 1985 Dhaka Rajiv Gandhi Zia ul-Haq SAARC Summit 
17 Dec 1985 New Delhi Rajiv Gandhi Zia ul-Haq Summit on Indo-Pak relations 
15 Mar 1986 Stockholm Rajiv Gandhi Mohd Khan 
Junejo 
Olaf Palme’s Funeral 
17 Nov 1986 Bangalore Rajiv Gandhi Mohd Khan 
Junejo 
SAARC Summit 
21 Feb 1987 New Delhi Rajiv Gandhi Zia ul-Haq Cricket match in Jaipur 
04 Nov 1987 Kathmandu Rajiv Gandhi Mohd Khan 
Junejo 
SAARC Summit 







Islamabad Rajiv Gandhi Benazir Bhutto SAARC Summit 
Jul 1989 Islamabad Rajiv Gandhi Benazir Bhutto Bilateral visit 
22 Nov 1990 Male Chandrasekhar Nawaz Sharif SAARC Summit 
24 May 1991 New Delhi Chandrasekhar Nawaz Sharif Rajiv Gandhi’s funeral 
17 Oct 1991 Harare Narasimha Rao Nawaz Sharif CHOGM Meeting 
21 Dec 1991 Colombo Narasimha Rao Nawaz Sharif SAARC Summit 
02 Feb 1992 Davos Narasimha Rao Nawaz Sharif World Economic Forum Meeting 
14 Jun 1992 Rio de Janeiro Narasimha Rao Nawaz Sharif Environment Meet 
03 Sep 1992 Jakarta Narasimha Rao Nawaz Sharif NAM Summit 
11 Apr 1992 Dhaka Narasimha Rao Nawaz Sharif SAARC Summit 
02 May 1995 New Delhi Narasimha Rao Farooq Ahmed 
Leghari 
SAARC Summit 
Limited War with Pakistan 15 
  
12 May 1997 Male IK Gujral Nawaz Sharif SAARC Summit 
23 Sep 1997 New York IK Gujral Nawaz Sharif UN GA Meeting 
25 Oct 1997 Edinburgh IK Gujral Nawaz Sharif CHOGM Meeting 
15 Jan 1998 Dhaka IK Gujral Nawaz Sharif Indo-Pak-Bangladesh trilateral 
business summit 
29 July 1998 Colombo AB Vajpayee Nawaz Sharif SAARC Summit 
29 July 1998 New York AB Vajpayee Nawaz Sharif UN GA Meeting 
20-21 Feb 
1999 
Lahore AB Vajpayee Nawaz Sharif Lahore Summit 
July 2001 Agra AB Vajpayee Pervez 
Musharraf 
Agra Summit 
Source: Chronology of Summit Meetings between India and Pakistan since 1947, Ministry of External Affairs, 
India, http://www.meadev.nic.in/agra-summit/chr-sum.htm. 
 
The foreign secretary level talks were the first major attempt by the Atal Behari Vajpayee government after 
the nuclear tests in May 1998. They started with a joint statement issued by the foreign secretaries of India and 
Pakistan in September 1998, which read: 
The Foreign Secretaries will commence the substantive dialogue with separate meetings on (a) peace 
and security including CBMs [confidence-building measures] and (b) Jammu and Kashmir in 
Islamabad on 15-18 October 1998. The remaining six subjects i.e., (c) Siachen, (d) Wullar 
Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project, (e) Sir Creek, (f) Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, (g) Economic 
and Commercial Cooperation, and (h) Promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields, shall be taken 
up in substantive and separate meetings in New Delhi in the first half of November 1998.3 
Subsequently the talks on these various issues did take place during November 1998 in New Delhi. 
However, the talks did not succeed due to differences, invariably on all issues. Though the talks failed at the 
foreign secretary level, the prime ministers of India and Pakistan made another bold attempt to improve the 
relations between the two countries, which resulted in the Lahore summit and the subsequent declaration in 
February 1999. 
The Lahore Declaration held that both India and Pakistan: 
• shall intensify their efforts to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir.  
• shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other’s internal affairs.  
• shall intensify their composite and integrated dialogue process for an early and positive outcome of the 
agreed bilateral agenda.  
• shall take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons 
and discuss concepts and doctrines with a view to elaborating measures for confidence building in the 
nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at prevention of conflict.  
• reaffirm their commitment to the goals and objectives of SAARC and to concert their efforts towards 
the realization of the SAARC vision for the year 2000 and beyond with a view to promoting the 
welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life through accelerated economic 
growth, social progress and cultural development.  
• reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to 
combat this menace.  
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• shall promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms4 
The Lahore Declaration was seen by India as the beginning of a new era—an era in which India believed 
that there could be real peace and understanding with Pakistan. This was coupled with the belief that democracy 
had finally dawned inside Pakistan and its military was under political control. The dismissal of General 
Jehangir Karamat by Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was indicative of civilian political supremacy over 
the military. 
 




Leaders of India and 
Pakistan 
Agreements/Understandings 
New Delhi, 01 
Nov 1982 
Indira Gandhi & Zia 
ul-Haq 
Decision to form a Joint Commission to discuss bilateral issues 
Decision to continue discussions on the “mutual guarantees of 
non-aggression and non-use of force”5 proposals and “Peace, 
Friendship and Cooperation”6 proposals that were circulated 
earlier by Pakistan and India respectively  
New Delhi, 10 
Mar 1983 
Indira Gandhi & Zia 
ul-Haq 
Establishment of a Joint Commission to discuss various issues 
between India and Pakistan7 
Islamabad, 29-
31 Dec 1988 
Rajiv Gandhi and 
Benazir Bhutto 
Signing of three bilateral agreements: 
Prohibition of attack on each other’s nuclear installations and 
facilities 
Cultural cooperation 
Avoidance of double taxation on incomes derived from 
international civil aviation transactions 
Islamabad, 16-
17 July 1989 
Rajiv Gandhi and 
Benazir Bhutto 
Joint communiqué expressing the desire to work towards a 
comprehensive settlement to reduce the chances of conflict and 





Decision to set up an additional hot line between the two leaders 
Decision to resume talks at foreign secretary levels8 
Male, 12 May 
1997 
IK Gujral and Nawaz 
Sharif 
Decision to reactivate the hotline 
Decision to constitute Joint Working Groups on various issues 
between India and Pakistan9 
Lahore, 20-21 
Feb 1999 
AB Vajpayee and 
Nawaz Sharif 
Lahore Declaration and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
between the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan 
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With the political process in tatters, the main question facing India was how to tackle Pakistan and 
convince its rulers that India was serious about the situation emerging inside Kashmir, without risking a 
conventional full-scale war? The Indian political and military leadership, drawing a leaf from their Kargil 
experience, advocated a similar exercise to be initiated by India on the other side of the Line of Control. Thus 
was born the idea of limited war with Pakistan upon the heights of Kargil after India realized that the political 
road to Islamabad was closed.  
George Fernandes was the first political leader to formally declare as early as January 2000 that there 
existed an option for limited war.10 According to Fernandes, such a limited war would supplant political 
objectives. Explaining his concept of limited war, he observed: 
The method of employing military power has been undergoing significant changes. Use of armed 
forces has moved much closer to the process of diplomacy. Historically, the soldiers took over when 
the diplomats failed and the diplomats had to take over when the soldiers came up against a block. In 
more modern times, the diplomat and the soldier have to work hand in hand particularly since the 
application of military power can serve a rational purpose only if directed by political goals and 
objectives.11 
Continuing Militancy in Kashmir 
Was the failure of the political process the only reason for the evolution of limited war theory in India? For 
decades India has been living with the deadlocked process, which is based on a “one step forward two steps 
backward” dictum. However, it was the persistent militancy in Jammu and Kashmir that made India look for an 
alternative strategy.  
Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir started slowly in the late 1980s, reached a peak in the early 1990s, started 
declining in the mid-1990s, and spiked again after the Kargil conflict, after which it steadily increased. 
 
Table 2.3: Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir 
 
 Militants Killed Security 
Personnel Killed 
Civilians Killed Total 
1988 1 1 29 31 
1989 0 13 79 92 
1990 183 132 862 1177 
1991 614 185 594 1393 
1992 873 177 859 1909 
1993 1328 216 1023 2567 
1994 1651 236 1012 2899 
1995 1338 297 1161 2796 
1996 1194 376 1333 2903 
1997 1177 355 840 2372 
1998 1045 339 877 2261 
                                                           
10 George Fernandes, while addressing the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)—a leading think tank 
established by the government of India—spoke about the idea of limited war with Pakistan for the first time in January 
2000. “Fernandes Unveils ‘Limited War’ Doctrine,” The Hindu, January 25, 2000. 
11 George Fernandes, “The Dynamics of Limited War,” Strategic Affairs (October 16, 2000), http://www.stratmag.com/ 
issueOct-15/page07.htm. 
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1999 1184 555 799 2538 
2000 1808 638 842 3288 
2001 2850 590 1067 4507 
2002 1714 469 839 3022 
2003 1546 338 658 2542 
Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheet/ 
annual_casualties.htm. 
 
Counter-militancy operations apart, the Indian government also attempted to deal with the militants 
politically, but in vain. In 2000, the Union government attempted two ceasefires, the first one with the Hizbul 
Mujahideen, in July 2000 and the second one a unilateral ceasefire in December 2000.  
India believed that the first ceasefire failed due to Pakistan’s pressure on the Hizbul Mujahideen. It all 
started with Majid Dar, who was later killed by his own group, announcing a unilateral cease-fire on July 24, 
2000 in Srinagar. The statement read: 
The primary objective of the announcement is to break the deadlock and make the atmosphere 
conducive for talks…There is a craving worldwide that peace and normality should return to the 
subcontinent which is passing through difficult times. Our decision is also in consonance with the 
statements by the Hurriyat leaders and the popular feelings…If India accepted our proposal and 
expressed its willingness for a meaningful dialogue it will be extended…12 
At that point in time, the Hizbul Mujahideen was undivided, and its supreme leader Syed Salahuddin 
endorsed the call for the ceasefire.13 The Union government and the Hizbul announced their team for dialogues 
on July 28 and 30 respectively. Just a day before the scheduled meeting between the representatives of the 
government and Hizbul, Salahuddin suddenly announced that if the Indian government did not include Pakistan 
in the negotiations by 5:00 am on August 8, 2000, the Hizbul would rethink the ceasefire offer.14 India refused 
to include anyone else in its dialogue with the Hizbul.15 On August 8, the Hizbul announced that it withdrew the 
ceasefire and resumed hostilities.16 The Indian government blamed Pakistan for pressurizing the Hizbul to 
include a rider to the ceasefire offer and later to withdraw it.17 
The second ill-fated ceasefire of 2000 was initiated as a unilateral announcement from the Union 
government on November 19, 2000. It too failed, as there were no takers for the government initiative. For its 
part, the government did not have clear objectives and failed to plan any corresponding dialogues with the 
ceasefire offer, only requesting local participation by those in Kashmir, six months after the announcement of 
the ceasefire, to discuss “peace and how it may be attained.”18 K.C. Pant was appointed as the interlocutor to 
initiate a dialogue in Kashmir. Due to various factors, the Pant mission failed to take off. 
The continuing militancy and the failure to curb it completely, either through political or military means 
was another reason that made India realize that it could not control it unless cross-border aspects of militancy 
were contained.  
How to combat militancy when militants are being trained, provided safe havens, and drawing material 
support from across the border? India expected the international community, especially the United States, to 
pressure Pakistan from supporting cross-border militancy, but all its efforts proved unsuccessful.  
                                                           
12 “Hizbul Announces Cease-fire,” The Hindu, July 25, 2000. 
13 Salahuddin was quoted as saying, “We own this offer, it is a tactical move…We have thrown the ball in India’s court. It 
must now respond positively.” See “Hizbul Chied Endorses Ceasefire,” Hindustan Times, July 26, 2000. 
14 “Salahuddin Sets August 8 as Deadline for Tripartite Talks,” The Hindu, August 4, 2000. 
15 “No Role for Pakistan: PM,” The Hindu, August 7, 2000. 
16 “Hizbul Mujahideen Revokes Ceasefire,” The Hindu, August 9, 2000. 
17 “Govt. Blames Pak., Open for Talks,” The Hindu, August 9, 2000. 
18 “Centre Invites Militants, Hurriyat for Dialogue on Kashmir,” The Daily Excelsior, April 6, 2000. 
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Unable to prevent militancy in Kashmir politically and militarily and not in a position to bring about 
international pressure on Pakistan to give up its support for cross-border terrorism, India started looking for a 
new strategy to deal with the problem on its own. Surgical strikes of militant camps and hot pursuit of militants 
across the Line of Control (LoC) were considered as two main strategies that India could rely upon while 
combating cross-border terrorism.  
Inherent in the strategies of hot pursuit and surgical strikes are the dangers of escalation. What if Pakistan 
decides to escalate the conflict during or after a hot pursuit? To be prepared to face the military consequences of 
the escalation, India needed an overall strategy, with which it could carry out operations against the militants on 
the other side of the LoC, without risking a large-scale conflict. The strategy of limited war fit India’s 
requirement of pursuing its immediate military strategies to combat militancy, yet without escalating the 
conflict level.  
Kargil as a Limited Conflict 
More than the failure at military and political levels to deal with the militancy, the military operations in Kargil 
made India believe that, like Pakistan, India could also carry out a military operation across the LoC. An 
extended analysis of the Kargil conflict is essential, since India’s concept of limited war is largely based on 
what happened in May and June of 1999 both in Kargil and outside it. 
The conflict in Kargil started with three shepherds observing movement of irregular and regular troops 
from the other side of the LoC on May 3, 1999, on the Jubbar Heights of Kargil sector.19 The intrusions were 
reported to the local Punjab regiment, which had sent two patrols to investigate into the intrusions on May 4 and 
5. Two more patrols were sent on May 7 and one more on May 14, 1999. Though the Indian army was 
convinced that Pakistan’s support for militancy would continue irrespective of the Lahore summit and the 
subsequent declaration, it never expected such a large-scale organized operation from the Pakistani side.20 Even 
the Kargil Review Committee, which was constituted later to examine the war, concluded that the intrusions 
came as a surprise. 
Until May 14, 1999, there was no report in the media about what was happening in the Kargil sector. Most 
of the reports between May 10 and 13 focused on “heavy shelling.”21 On May 10, reports mentioned about 
“eight to ten artillery shells” hitting the “cantonment base at Kargil” and “troops as well as civilians” being 
evacuated from there.22 On May 11 it was reported that the “Pakistani troops fired around 70 artillery shells,” 
from which no military personnel suffered any damage, except for a coolie working with the Indian army who 
was killed, and three civilians who were injured.23 The same report also mentioned most people from Baroo 
village and Kargil town migrating “to safer places in view of increasing threat to their life and property in the 
exchange of shelling.”24  
The enormity of the intrusion was reported for the first time in regional newspapers in Kashmir. The Daily 
Excelsior on May 12, 1999 reported that in the early morning of May 11, “An Army patrol spotted a group of 
200 to 300 foreign militants which seemed to have infiltrated into this side for the last three days. Almost the 
entire brigade strength of 121-Infantry was immediately mobilized for what could possibly be the largest 
counter-insurgency operation of the last 10 years in Jammu & Kashmir.” For the first time, the firing along the 
LoC by the Pakistani troops for the previous three days was seen as an effort by Pakistan to provide cover for 
                                                           
19 Initially there was a controversy over the composition of the infiltrators. India, right from the beginning has been accusing 
Pakistan of sending its regular troops along with the mujahideen. Pakistan, though, refused to acknowledge the presence of 
any regular troops initially. However, their presence has been proved beyond a doubt and even accepted by writers from 
Pakistan at a later stage. 
20 One day before the shepherds identified intrusion in Kargil, General V.P. Malik made an interesting and perceptive 
observation. He said on May 2, 1999, “It is in our assessment that Pakistan will continue to pursue belligerence, abet 
infiltration and indulge in proxy war at a higher level. The recent Lahore Declaration has not in any way changed the ground 
situation in Kashmir. If anything, the Pakistani Army and ISI [Inter Services Intelligence] are still active in aiding and 
abetting terrorism in the state.” See “Malik Sees Trouble on Pak Front,” The Times of India, May 3, 1999 . 
21 “Kargil Shelled Again by Pak Rangers,” The Hindu, May 10, 1999. 
22 “Arms Dump Blown up in Shelling in Kargil,” Daily Excelsior, May 10, 1999. 
23 “Coolie Killed, Three Injured in Kargil Shelling,” Daily Excelsior, May 11, 1999. 
24 Ibid. 
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the infiltrators.25 The local media reported on May 13, 1999 about “heavy casualties” near the LoC at Kargil as 
a result of a “fierce battle” between “Indian security forces and a thick group of Pakistani infiltrators.” The 
same report also mentioned about two companies of paratroopers being airlifted from Kupwara and “dropped at 
strategically important points in Kargil border area.”26 For the first time, reports were made on infiltrators 
capturing posts two to five kilometers inside the Indian side of the LoC. The one-line official response for these 
developments was that “the Defence authorities neither confirm nor deny the report.”27 
On May 13, the Jammu correspondent of Doordarshan reported Lt. Col. S.P.K. Singh, the Public Relations 
Officer of Northern Command Headquarters, as confirming the death of seven Indian soldiers and ten militants.  
For the first time, it was reported in the regional press that the Indian army authorities at Kargil had begun to 
believe that it was actually a number of Pakistani regular army personnel who had made the incursion on 
Tuesday, captured two Indian posts and killed a group of four Indian soldiers. Officials have now developed 
doubts regarding the identity of the intruders who had earlier been described as “Pakhtoon-like militants.”28 
Yet there was no mention about such intrusions in the national media. The Hindu reported on May 14, 1999 
of a “war-like situation in Kargil,” in which the “the presence of scores of militants with the Army” was not 
ruled out.29 The Hindu reported on May 15 that the Defence Ministry denied “reports about the fall of an Indian 
post at the wake of Pakistani firing in Kargil.” However, the Defence Ministry was quoted as saying that 
“Pakistani Army regulars and trained Mujahideens had infiltrated the area under the cover of fire.” Infiltrators 
were then believed to have “occupied some remote and ‘unheld’ areas” and that “further inflow of militants in 
the area had been stopped.”30 On May 19, 1999, it was reported that the Indian army had “gunned down 52 
heavily armed Pakistan-backed militants and injured many others” and in the process lost nine men. It was 
reported that “an estimated 350 militants, dressed like local shepherds, had been pushed in by Pakistan Army 
under the cover of artillery gunfire.”31 
Irrespective of visits by the defense minister and the chief of army staff, India did not yet realize the extent 
of infiltration.32 George Fernandes mentioned on May 14 that there was no need to be worried about the 
sporadic shelling by Pakistan33 and on May 16 announced that the infiltrators from the Kargil sector would be 
pushed out in forty-eight hours.34  
On May 22, Farooq Abdullah, the chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, presided over a meeting of the 
Unified headquarters in Jammu, which was also attended by the chief secretary; Mr. Ashok Jaitly, security 
advisor to the state government; Lt. General A.S. Khanna, General Officer Commanding (GOC) 16 Corps; 
Director General Police, Mr. Gurbachan Jagat; and Principal Secretary, Home, Mr. C. Phunsog. The focus was 
rather on the militant situation on Jammu, especially the anti-militancy operations in the Doda, Udhampur, 
Poonch, and Rajouri districts. The meeting was said to have discussed various issues including “supply of 
water, electricity, civic amenities, shifting of Jammu Bus Stand, installation of street lights, local bodies, cement 
shortage and transport hazards.”35 On May 23, Maj. Gen. P.P.S. Bindera at the Northern Command HQ was 
quoted as claiming that the infiltrators were on the run in the Drass and Batalik sectors, since they had 
exhausted their ammunition and their firepower was reduced drastically.36 
                                                           
25 “LoC Turns into Battlefield: 200 Pakistani Militants Storm into Kargil,” Daily Excelsior, May 12, 1999. 
26 “Heavy Casualties Feared in Kargil Operation: Hospital, Civilian Population Evacuated,” Daily Excelsior, May 13, 1999. 
27 The LoC was also believed to have been captured by the infiltrators before they moved two to five kilometers into this 
side of the border. 
28 “Pak Troops Believed Engaged in Battle: Army Confirms Seventeen Casualties in Kargil,” Daily Excelsior, May 14, 
1999. 
29 “War-like Situation in Kargil,” The Hindu, May 14, 1999. 
30 “Indian Posts Safe: Defence Ministry,” The Hindu, May 15, 1999. 
31 “52 Militants Died in Kargil Operation,” The Indian Express, May 19, 1999. 
32 Defence Minister George Fernandes visited the Kargil sector on May 13, 1999 (Daily Excelsior, May 14, 1999). Gen. 
Malik visited the areas on May 23 (Hindustan Times, May 24, 1999). 
33 “Forces Well Prepared: George,” Daily Excelsior, May 15, 1999. 
34 “Infiltration Will Be Pushed out in 48 Hours: George,” Daily Excelsior, May 17, 1999. 
35 “Unified Hqrs Review Security Situation,” Daily Excelsior, May 22, 1999. 
36 “Ammunition over, Infiltrators on the Run, Claims Army,” The Indian Express, May 24, 1999. 
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During this first phase, India deliberately wanted to downplay the events as a mere localized flare-up. Lt. 
General Krishan Pal, GOC, 15 Corps felt that Pakistan was “itching for a limited war but we will not fall into 
this trap.”37 
May 25 was a crucial day in the conflict. For the first time, it was stated by the Indian military leadership 
that eviction would be a tougher job and that no conclusive timeframe to end the operation could be foreseen. 
Maj. Gen. J. J. Singh, Additional Director, Military Operations was quoted as telling that the infiltrators had 
taken up positions up to six kilometers inside Indian territory and were spread over large areas in Drass, Batalik, 
Kaksar, and Mashkoh.38 He also observed that the infiltrators possessed sophisticated instruments including 
missiles, radars, snowmobiles, mortars, sophisticated military communication equipment, and automatic 
weapons.39 Thus for the first time, the military came to realize and publicly acknowledge the extent of the 
infiltration, the weapons that the infiltrators possessed, and the possible time that it would take to evict them.  
May 25 was also important as the date of the first meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) to 
review the situation, three weeks after the infiltrators were spotted for the first time on May 3. This meeting 
ended the initial phase of Indian ignorance on the extent of infiltration and also signified the Indian resolve to 
fight infiltration, both militarily and politically. 
Surprisingly, not long before India held its first major meeting on the infiltration, Nawaz Sharif, the prime 
minister of Pakistan, had a meeting with General Pervez Musharraf on May 22 and decided “to give a befitting 
response to India, if New Delhi launched any misadventure at the Line of Control.”40 On the same day that India 
called its first CCS meeting, Pakistan also had a meeting at a comparable level, attended by its political and 
military leadership.41 
On the military front, the Indian air force (IAF) was put into action beginning on May 26, which signaled 
the beginning of the second phase. It was a clear indication that India was ready to escalate the conflict to 
protect its interests. The official statement mentioned, “This is the start of the operations and they would 
continue till our defence forces re-occupy our territory…Any escalation of this conflict will be entirely the 
responsibility of Pakistan.”42 Though Pakistan threatened that it would retaliate, India continued with the aerial 
bombings.43 At the same time, India also decided to establish hotline contact at the Director General of Military 
Operations (DGMO) level with Pakistan.44 At a political level, Vajpayee contacted Nawaz Sharif and told him 
that India would not allow any intrusion to take place on its territory.45 George Fernandes met the heads of the 
US and UK missions in New Delhi and apprised them of the latest developments.46 The military operations took 
more than two weeks to reach any positive results at the ground level. The first major achievement was the 
recapture of Batalik Top on June 11, 1999.  
The period between May 26 and June 10 could be called the second phase of the conflict, in which India 
began its effort in earnest to defend its territory. This phase was a defensive one, as it tried with great 
difficulty— given the terrain and logistical problems—to drive the infiltrators away. This phase witnessed 
several events that threatened to escalate and at the same time also stabilized and limited the conflict. The 
threats to escalate the conflict came primarily from Pakistan.  
First was Pakistan’s military response. On May 27, 1999, Pakistan shot down an Indian MiG-21 aircraft, 
killing Sqn. Ldr. Ojha. Another pilot, Flt. Lt. Nachiketa, was captured as he ejected from his MiG-27 after it 
                                                           
37 Quoted in Ramesh Vinayak, “Nasty Surprise,” India Today (May 31, 1999): 21. 
38 “Eviction Difficult, Admits Army,” The Times of India, May 26, 1999. 
39 Ibid. 
40 “PM, COAS Discuss Indian Build-up at LoC,” The News, May 23, 1999. 
41 The high-level meeting took place in Islamabad on May 25 and was attended by the foreign minister, Kashmir affairs 
minister, defense secretary, acting army chief, director general military operations (DGMO), and commander of 10 Corps. 
The News, May 26, 1999. 
42 “IAF Bombs Militant Posts,” The Hindu, May 27, 1999. 
43 Sartaj Aziz, the then foreign minister of Pakistan, responded to the use of the Indian air force by stating, “We are 
retaliating and we will retaliate.” “Indian Action Unwarranted, Says Pak,” The Hindu, May 27, 1999. 
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experienced a mechanical problem. On May 28, the infiltrators shot down a Mi-17 helicopter on the Indian side 
of the LoC. 
Second was Pakistan’s threat to escalate the conflict. On May 27, Nawaz Sharif was quoted as saying that 
the nuclear tests of 1998 had provided Pakistan the confidence to counter any attack. He was further quoted as 
pronouncing that the people of Pakistan “are confident for the first time in their history that in the eventuality of 
an armed attack they will be able to meet it on equal terms.” Clearly Sharif was indicating the military failure of 
the previous wars with India was no longer in their minds, as the nuclear tests had given them new confidence. 
On May 31, Pakistan Foreign Secretary Shamsad Ahmad explicitly warned: “We [Pakistan] will not hesitate to 
use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity.” 
Third was the failure to communicate to each other at the highest political level. Vajpayee and Nawaz 
Sharif had signed the Lahore Declaration only months before. More importantly, Vajpayee and Sharif had 
decided to engage in secret negotiations after the summit in Lahore. R.K. Mishra, a respected Indian politician 
and journalist, and Niaz A. Naik, former foreign secretary of Pakistan, were chosen as the trusted emissaries of 
Vajpayee and Sharif and were holding secret parleys in New Delhi and Islamabad.47 Before the conflict reached 
its climax in Kargil, there were six rounds of talks between March 3 and May 17, 1999.48 There were specific 
questions from the Indian side to Pakistan on the meetings of April 12, April 21, and May 17, 1999. To quote 
Niaz Naik: 
On 12 April…Mishra came again to Islamabad. This time, however, he appeared to be a little 
perturbed. Vajpayee had told him that Indian intelligence was reporting that the usual springtime 
infiltration of militants across the LOC was already underway. Nawaz Sharif told Mishra in my 
presence that he would use his influence to correct the situation.49 
On April 21, Niaz Naik continues: 
Mishra returned to Islamabad for yet another round of talks. He stated that India was now in possession 
of much more information about militants’ infiltration across the LOC. He made no specific mention 
of the Kargil sector, however. At this, Nawaz Sharif promised to take concrete steps to rectify the 
problem.50 
The May 17 meeting was significant. According to Naik: 
He [R.K. Mishra] told me that Vajpayee was under fire from hawkish elements in India. The Indian 
Prime Minister was still awaiting clarification of the situation from Nawaz. At this 17 May 
meeting…[Mishra] met with Nawaz alone while I waited outside the Prime Minister’s office. There 
was a little tension in the air. After about ten minutes, Mishra stepped out of the Prime Minister’s 
office to go to the washroom. In his absence, Nawaz asked me (in Punjabi): “What’s wrong with him? 
He is asking me whether on 20 February (the date of Lahore Summit) I knew of the Kargil plan.” 
Nawaz did not give a reply to his question, at least not in my presence. Using ambiguous language, he 
told Mishra that he would look into the matter.51 
                                                           
47 Niaz Naik has explained the substance of the talks between the two emissaries later in many of his exclusive interviews on 
the subject. R.K. Mishra to date has not spoken about the Indian perspective of the secret negotiations that he had with Naik. 
Robert G. Wirsing has given a detailed account of Naik’s views in his recent book on Kashmir. See Robert G. Wirsing, 
Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003): 25-33. See also 
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49 Wirsing, Kashmir in the Shadow of War, 29. Emphasis added. 
50 Ibid., 30. Emphasis added. 
51 Ibid. 
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Irrespective of these three meetings, especially the last, the political leadership in India and Pakistan failed 
to communicate with each other on the gravity of the situation even after developing a rapport at the Lahore 
summit and establishing secret negotiations. Sharif, though informed by Mishra at least thrice, failed to give a 
satisfactory reply to Vajpayee’s concerns. The third meeting was significant, as Mishra had communicated to 
Sharif Vajpayee’s doubts over his sincerity at Lahore. Sharif, after realizing that an element of mistrust was 
developing, could have dispatched Naik immediately to New Delhi to meet with Vajpayee either alone or with 
Mishra. Unfortunately that never happened, as the next meeting was scheduled only on June 25, 1999.  
The same period also witnessed efforts by India and Pakistan at stabilizing the situation. On May 28, 
Nawaz Sharif announced that Pakistan was willing to send its foreign minister, Sartaj Aziz, to India to defuse 
the situation.52 On June 3, Flt. Lt. Nachiketa was released and handed over to the Indian High Commissioner in 
Pakistan. Meanwhile the DGMOs between India and Pakistan established their hotline.53 
Externally, there was pressure from the West, especially from the United States, to defuse the crisis. US 
President Bill Clinton wrote to Sharif asking him to “take steps to defuse the crisis and respect the Line of 
Control.” 
The third phase of the conflict can be traced (with slight chronological overlap with the second) from May 
11 to July 5, 1999. From the recapture of the Batalik Top, the first major military achievement of this phase on 
May 11, India went full throttle at both military and political levels to clear the infiltrators from the Kargil 
sector.54  
On the military front, India captured the crucial Tololing peak in Dras sector on June 13. The Indian 
military response intensified on June 17 when India launched Mirage 2000 planes to bombard the enemy supply 
lines in Batalik sector. The use of air power, though debated in terms of its utility in Kargil, without any doubt 
broke the infiltrators both physically and psychologically, as well as interdicting their supply lines.55 Towards 
the end of June, the IAF also began night operations.56 
Point 5140 was re-captured on June 20;57 Point 5203 in the Batalik sector on June 21; six more heights 
around Point 5203 on June 23;58 major peaks closer to the Tiger Hill on June 30; two heights on Jubar Hills on 
July 1; and the strategic Tiger Hill on July 5. In addition, India decided to provide an emergency allocation of 
Rs. 600 crore to the army to buy ammunition for its Bofors 155 MM gun.59 The finance minister also 
announced that the Indian economy was capable of managing the impact of the Kargil conflict.60 
On the political front, Vajpayee informed Clinton of India’s resolve to rid its territory of the infiltrators in a 
telephone conversation with him on June 14. On June 15, India refused a US suggestion for diffusing the 
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situation through direct Indo-Pak talks, stating that there could be no meaningful dialogue until the infiltrators 
moved back across the LoC.  
India, on the bilateral front, refused to negotiate with Pakistan, except on the question of Pakistan 
withdrawing from the Kargil heights. On June 1, Fernandes announced: “There is no question of negotiating 
any ceasefire: our position is very clear. All those who have been pushed into our territory by the Pakistani side, 
including Pakistani troops, should go back.”61 When Pakistan volunteered to send Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz 
to India for talks in the first week of June, India showed its reluctance by telling Pakistan that the date was not 
convenient for it to do so.62 The Foreign Office spokesman of India, responding to Aziz’s earlier statement that 
the LoC is not well defined, retorted, “The Line of Control is well defined and fully settled. We would like to 
make it clear that the comments relating to the LoC made by the Pakistani Foreign Minister cannot be the 
subject for discussion.”63 When Aziz finally came to New Delhi on June 12, 1999 and met Foreign Minister 
Jaswant Singh, the latter gave him two points—to vacate the aggression in Kargil and to restore the status quo 
ante—while the former wanted to have a wide discussion. Responding to a question, Jaswant Singh stressed that 
the meeting that he had with Aziz was not a part of any dialogue. He was quoted as saying that “it will be a 
misnomer to call it a dialogue” and “the dialogue process was abandoned by Pakistan through misadventure.”64  
The next bilateral move, which was held secretly, was to reactivate the Mishra-Naik track. After the 
previous meeting on May 17, R.K. Mishra went to Islamabad on June 25 and met Niaz Naik. There are several 
accounts of Mishra’s trip to Islamabad. A.G. Noorani, a highly respected commentator in India, wrote that the 
meeting took place much earlier. According to him, Mishra traveled with Vivek Katju on June 18.65 According 
to Nazim Zehra, a Pakistani journalist, both Mishra and Katju reached Islamabad on June 20, 1999 to meet 
Sharif.66 According to Niaz Naik, however, Mishra told Naik on June 25 that India and Pakistan were “one inch 
away from war” and asked Naik to convey that to Sharif.67 On receiving the message from Mishra, according to 
Niaz Naik, Sharif prepared a written message for Vajpayee consisting of the following four points: 
• Both prime ministers should reiterate their commitment to the Lahore process; 
• Both India and Pakistan should take concrete steps to restore the sanctity of the Line of Control; 
• The Indian side should stop the shelling and aerial bombing in the Kargil sector in order to restore an 
atmosphere conducive to peace, and 
• Both prime ministers should renew efforts to complete the process started at Lahore to include 
resolution of all issues between them, including Jammu and Kashmir.68 
Naik went to New Delhi on Vajpayee’s invitation and met with him on June 27 to discuss the four points. 
Vajpayee told him: 
Pakistan should announce the withdrawal of its forces from Kargil and all would be ok. I [Niaz Naik] 
stressed that both sides would have to commit themselves to withdrawal. Vajpayee repeated that the 
directors-general of military operations of each side’s army should together work out a plan for the 
mutual withdrawal of forces.69 
According to Niaz Naik, it was agreed that Nawaz Sharif would stop at New Delhi on his way to China. 
The plan was for Sharif to send a message of “peace and good will” to the Indian prime minister on his way to 
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Beijing; the Indian prime minister would invite him to New Delhi. While Niaz Naik has not elaborated on what 
the two prime ministers planned to do in New Delhi, Nasim Zehra wrote that they hoped to sign a slightly 
modified four points agreement. According to Zehra the four points were:70 
• Appropriate steps to be taken by both sides to mutually respect the LoC determined under the Simla 
agreement 
• Immediate resumption of the composite dialogue initiated under the Lahore process 
• Islamabad to use its influence on the mujahideen to request them to disengage 
• Find an expeditious solution to the Kashmir dispute within the specified time-frame 
Information on the meeting leaked and the meeting did not materialize. According to Naik and Zehra, India 
backtracked and instead of agreeing to invite Sharif to New Delhi, Vajpayee issued a warning that “Pakistan 
must withdraw its forces from Kargil or New Delhi would take appropriate action.”71 
Why did New Delhi fail to go ahead with the meeting and Vajpayee refuse to sign such an agreement?  
According to Noorani, “Had the deal gone through on June 27, the result would have been vastly better than the 
one that came after July 11. Bilateralism would have received a powerful boost.”72 In fact, without knowing that 
both were so close to signing an agreement, there was an element of support for the Naik-Mishra diplomacy.73 
Many inside India were hopeful of a peaceful settlement with Pakistan, but it was not meant to be.74 The reason, 
according to Noorani, was that “some people in New Delhi wanted to flourish a military victory for electoral 
ends, in preference to a diplomatic situation.”75  
India deliberately downplayed and ignored the war threats from Pakistan during this period.76 Vajpayee 
made a symbolic tour to Kashmir during the second week of June and reiterated once again that talks with 
Pakistan were possible only after the latter pulled back its troops from Kargil.77 To Sharif’s threat issued on 
June 20 to have “more Kargil-like situations,”78 India issued a counter threat on June 23; at a press conference, 
Gen. V.P. Malik made a deliberate statement: “If necessary, we [Indian troops] can cross the LoC in the 
supreme national interest, but the decision lies with the cabinet.”79 
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The last phase of the conflict started from July 5—the day on which Sharif signed an agreement with 
Clinton agreeing to respect the Line of Control. The statement read: 
It was agreed between the President [of the United States] and Prime Minister [of Pakistan] that 
concrete steps will be taken for the restoration of the Line of Control in accordance with the Simla 
agreement.80 
Though there was a lot of opposition from inside Pakistan against the Clinton-Sharif agreement, the 
government at Islamabad initiated measures to de-escalate the conflict. The Indian army continued its 
operations against the infiltrators, as the infiltrators did not leave and continued fighting. Point 4812 and Dog 
Hill were recaptured on July 6; Jubar height and Point 4268, the next day.81 The army cleared the infiltrators 
and reached the LoC on Batalik sector on July 9;82 Rocky Knob, the last major peak in Mushkoh valley, was 
cleared on July 10.83 Lt. Gen. N.C. Vij, the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO), declared on July 
26 that the territory was completely free from the infiltrators.84 
Was Kargil a Limited War? 
Surprisingly, the term “limited war” to describe the Kargil conflict appeared in the Pakistani media long before 
Indian papers and analysts started realizing the nature and intensity of the operations. A news report read, 
“Pakistan Army claimed having captured 20 Indian posts in ‘limited war’ with India which involved use of 
missiles.”85 
In retrospect, India perceives Kargil as a limited war. Did Pakistan perceive it as a limited war, before 
initiating it? If the above-mentioned report is to be believed, then someone from the army should have briefed 
the reporter on the nature of the conflict and its progress.  
The Territory 
The confrontation took place in four sub-sectors—Mushkoh, Drass, Kaksar, and Batalik—covering a distance 
of 150 km. These sectors cover the towns of Turtok, Batalik, Kargil, Kaksar, and Dras along with the Chorbatla 
and Mushkoh valleys.86  
India deliberately decided to fight within the LoC, though occasionally threats were issued about crossing 
over. One reason why India did not to cross the LoC was to retain international pressure on Pakistan. By not 
crossing the LoC, India was able to convince the international community that the conflict was initiated by 
Pakistan and therefore had to be diffused by the latter. There was open support for India’s stand. Second, India 
did not want to escalate the conflict by crossing over. Irrespective of pressure within, the Indian political 
leadership did not want to cross the LoC, as could be seen from the statement made by Indian Air Chief 
Marshal Tipnis: “The government wants to ensure there is no escalation. The implications of restricted use of 
air power were made clear to it.”87 
The Use of Weapons 
The use of weapons was limited to mortars, multi-barrel rockets, and howitzers from the Indian side. The Indian 
military used 300 pieces of artillery, including 100 Bofors 155 mm guns, firing an average 5,000 shells a day.88 
The infiltrators from the Pakistani side mainly used machine guns, mortars, and even surface-to-air missiles 
(SAMs), while Pakistani army regulars used howitzers from across the border to bombard the Indian side. 
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Occasionally, Pakistan used its helicopters, operating clandestinely over Indian air space.89 It also used its Anza 
missiles, one of which hit the Indian MiG-21, killing its pilot Sqn. Ldr. Ojha.90 
The infiltrators used the SAMs for the first time in the history of militancy in Kashmir.91 It was believed 
that the SAMs were Stinger missiles provided by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the Afghan 
mujahideen during their fight against the Soviet Union in the 1980s.92 The fact that the infiltrators were armed 
with SAMs was a clear indication that Pakistan expected India to use its air force. 
The Use of Air Power 
The use of air power during the conflict was also limited. Initially the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) of 
India rejected the use of the Indian air force as requested by its army. Both the CCS and the air force believed 
that introduction of air power would escalate the conflict. According to a report, it was Gen. V.P. Malik who 
convinced Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis to include air support on May 24, 1999, after which both made an 
appeal to the CCS.93  
Air strikes started only on May 26, 1999. The reasons for the delayed use of the air force are many. First, 
realization on the extent of infiltration came in late. Second, as discussed earlier, the Indian political leadership 
was apprehensive that the use of air power might send wrong signals and escalate the conflict. It was also 
reported that the Indian army was initially reluctant to involve the air force.94  
The IAF used MiG-21s, MiG-27s and improvised Mi-17 helicopter gun ships.95 On average, forty sorties 
were carried out every day.96 From May 30 onwards, the IAF started using Mirage-2000 planes. In all, 550 
strike, 150 reconnaissance, and 500 escort missions, along with 2,185 helicopter sorties, were carried out.97  
Air attacks and surveillance by Indian air assets were limited to its side of the LoC. Though occasional 
straying to the other side of the LoC might have occurred, there was a deliberate attempt by Indian political and 
military high commands to keep the air operations contained to the Indian side of the LoC. The reasons are not 
difficult to decipher. First, this was pursuant with its larger strategy of keeping the conflict limited within its 
territory. Second, any air operation across the border would have escalated the conflict, a result for which 
Pakistan had been hoping. The fact that the infiltrators were armed with Stinger missiles is proof that the 
planners of the Kargil incursion expected the use of air power. Before India even started contemplating the use 
of its air power on May 22, 1999, Brig. Rashid Qureshi, Director General of Inter Service Public Relations 
(ISPR) made a statement that “no violation of Pakistani air space will go unnoticed.”98 He also stated, “Placing 
of fighter squadrons on high alert [in India] is a threat to us [Pakistan].”99 Earlier, the Indian air force had placed 
two of its fighter squadrons on alert for “possible strike operations” in Kashmir’s Dras-Kargil-Batalik region.100 
Third, the shooting down of two Indian MiG aircrafts and a helicopter by Pakistan made India extremely 
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cautious.101 Besides the economic costs, the psychological costs of losing an aircraft and its impact on the 
morale of the troops and infiltrators might have factored into the cautious use of air power against the 
infiltrators. 
The Use of Manpower 
What numbers were involved in the fighting on both sides? Indian estimates of the number of infiltrators varied. 
Initially India believed that not more than a few hundred had infiltrated. On May 24, one day before the crucial 
CCS meeting and two days before the initial use of air power, it was estimated that there were around 300 
militants on the various heights based on satellite pictures.102 By the first week of June 1999, the Indian army 
believed that there were 700 infiltrators.103 During the same period, India had already mobilized 20,000 men 
into the conflict zone.104 By the second week, the estimated number of militants rose to 1,000.105  
By the last week of June, the numbers rose even further and India became convinced that the infiltrators 
included both Pakistani soldiers and mujahideen. A news report based on the Indian army’s air and field 
observations reported that the infiltrators could be in the range of a brigade (three battalions) or around 2,500 
fighters.106 However, in the final tally, it was estimated there were 1,500 infiltrators opposed by 20,000 Indian 
troops.107 
The only authoritative account of the conflict from the Pakistani side was published later by Brig. Shaukat 
Qadir in 2002. According to him, 
The total number of troops [from Pakistan’s side] occupying [the posts in Kargil] never exceeded 
1,000 from all ranks. Four times this number provided the logistical backup to undertake the 
operation.108 
 
Table 2.4: The Ghosts of Kargil 
 
 Indian Casualties Pakistani Casualties 
 Dead Injured Dead Injured 
6 June 1999109 51 230 200  
11 June 1999110 98 317 250  
24 June 1999111 175 550 350 700 
12 July 1999112 398 578 691  
Final Figures113 524 1365 737114  
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The Cost of Kargil 
By the second week of June 1999, it was estimated that India was spending approximately $4 million every day 
on the conflict.115 According to an assessment in the third week of June, India would have spent in the range of 
Rupees 5,000 to 6,000 crores, if the situation dragged for three months.116 The final cost was estimated to be 
Rupees 1,110 crores, or an average of Rupees 15 crores every day.117 
India believed, as demonstrated by the statements of its finance and external affairs minister, that it could 
meet the economic challenge. Jaswant Singh asserted, “For us [India] the battle will be a cut in the finger. But 
Pakistan will bleed itself dry, if it doesn’t see reason.”118 
The Threat of Escalation 
Besides the actual conflict, which witnessed the use of power by both India and Pakistan, there were subtle and 
explicit threats of escalating the conflict into an open war between the two countries.  
The first major declaration of threat came from Sartaj Aziz after India launched its air attack. By then two 
significant meetings at the highest levels involving military and political leadership had taken place in Pakistan. 
The first meeting took place at the Chakala airbase on May 22, where Gen. Pervez Musharraf informed Sharif 
on the “high state of operational preparedness of the Pakistan armed forces.”119 The second meeting took place 
on May 25, the same day the Indian CCS was convening in New Delhi.120 On May 26, claiming that as many as 
ten bombs fell inside “Azad Kashmir,”121 Aziz warned, “We will take necessary steps to defend ourselves…We 
are retaliating and we will retaliate.”122 On the same day Brigadier Rashid Qureshi was quoted as stating that 
Pakistan reserved the right to “use all available options” including the use of air power.123 Pakistan feared that 
the use of air power and troop mobilization by India might lead it to undertake a hot pursuit. Therefore, Pakistan 
decided to keep its troops on high alert.124 Pakistan also expected that India might capture certain posts in “Azad 
Kashmir” to divert attention from India’s internal political problems. 
On June 6, 1999, Nawaz Sharif announced, “Chances of a war between Pakistan and India cannot be ruled 
out.” However, the very next day Sharif withdrew the statement and said that Pakistan was not in favor of 
developing the situation into a full-scale war.  
Besides this saber rattling, were there attempts by Pakistan to escalate the conflict? Throughout the conflict, 
Pakistan accused India of escalating the conflict. Munir Akram, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United Nations, 
stated, “The present crisis in Kashmir has been caused by India’s over-reaction to a military reversal in its 
Kashmir war and by its effort to involve and attack Pakistan in an attempt to explain this reversal to its public 
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opinion.”125 Tariq Altaf, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, accused India of being “on the warpath.” A 
news report warned India of Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG) preparing to launch an airborne assault in 
Ladakh.126 There was another report claiming that the Indian army had found a plan to grab Turtok in Ladakh 
and integrate it with its Northern Areas.127 Pakistan also warned of “more Kargil-like” situations.128 
India deliberately downplayed the threats of escalation.129 Irrespective of the pressure from within, the 
political leadership refused to permit crossing the Line of Control, despite the fact that it was believed that 
unless there was a “swift surgical strike” across the LoC, the supply lines of the infiltrators could never be 
stopped.130 The pressure came from security experts, including former military high commands, and also from 
political leaders. Gen. Shankar Roy Chowdhury, former Indian chief of army staff, said that it was “an 
impractical proposition for the Army to flush out the intruders without crossing the LoC.” Gen. V.N. Sharma, 
who was the COAS before Chowdhury, asserted that “without crossing the LoC and encircling them would 
mean a lot of casualties, which is not a strong military tactic.”131 Popular pressure to expand the war and cross 
the LoC was enormous. An article that appeared in The Pioneer summed up the emotional popular response. It 
read: 
Six of our soldiers were brutally hacked by the enemy troops. They were not killed in firing. They 
were chained, burnt by cigarette butts; their eyes were gouged out, their ears, noses and genitals 
chopped while they were alive. There could only be few parallels of such barbarism between two 
nations who are otherwise talking of friendship . . . And it is all Pakistan’s creation. Not ours. Not at 
all. Now tell Sartaj Aziz to go back. Tell him, we will talk to him when we throw his troops out of our 
home. Don’t give them any safe passage. Catch them alive or dead. Rub it into Aziz. What are we 
going to talk anyway? The line of control is debatable? That the death of our men is merely statistics? 
That the areas captured by Pak brigands can be negotiable? That there is no war? Don’t confuse the 
military. It is already very confused by the political double talk. Let them do their duty. They know 
how to do it. They have a task and they will complete it. They offer no excuses. But they don’t want 
their hands tied either. Untie their hands. Let them fight the war as it should be. Our soldiers are not 
fodder for Pak cannons. Let them fight the enemy as an enemy. Don’t show him the Line of Control. 
Pakistan still has supply routes, ammunition dumps stores, artillery guns, all positioned just inside their 
LoC. Those are the critical targets. The enemy has to be starved, confused and the only way to do is to 
hit the nerve center. No amount of bombing the heights would achieve anything if the enemy troops 
manage to get their supplies of ammunition and storage regularly. We must choke them. And choking 
cannot be done by letting them stand and take pot shots at us while our men die in dozens. We cannot 
let the sacrifices go un-acknowledged. For every drop of blood shed by our men, thousand drops 
should be extracted from across the border. The bus can wait. It is a question of a nation’s self-esteem. 
A nation without self-esteem is not worth dying for.132 
Others, however, felt that India should not cross the LoC, but finish the war fast and get back to the dialogue 
process initiated in Lahore. In its perceptive editorial, the Hindustan Times summed up why India should not 
cross the LoC while fighting the war:  
It is not the government which is fighting the LoC battle, but the entire country. Rather than encourage 
postures of belligerence and warmongering, the government should go in for an early swift 
achievement of its basic aim of regaining total control over the area on Indian side of the Line of 
Control. Any extension of conflict to other areas or a protracted war would not only be at an 
unbearable cost to the nation but also result in the erosion of international support to media. Kargil is a 
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fight to win back territory, but the Lahore process aims at winning hearts and minds. It should not be 
allowed to supersede the gains and relevance of the latter.133 
The strategic community, though divided over the means, was united over the end—that the infiltrators should 
be cleared off and the LoC should be respected by Pakistan.134 There was pressure on the government to give 
the Indian military a free hand to drive the infiltrators away.135 
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Threat of Nuclear Weapons 
What role did nuclear weapons play before and during the Kargil conflict? Was Kargil a result of the nuclear 
tests carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998? Or, were nuclear weapons just one of several factors in Pakistan 
launching the infiltration? Did the presence of nuclear weapons deter India and Pakistan from escalating the 
conflict, thereby keeping the conflict limited? 
Strategists differ in their opinion on the role of nuclear weapons in Kargil. V.R. Raghavan argued: 
The defence of national interest, nevertheless, cannot justify a recourse to nuclear weapons. On the 
other hand, nuclear weapons did not deter Pakistan from launching the offensive. One can even 
conclude that nuclear weapons encouraged it to think otherwise. The limits of the “currency of power,” 
which nuclear weapons signify in some circles, are made apparent in Kargil.136 
India neither contemplated the use of nuclear weapons nor gave any threat of their use during the conflict. 
Pakistan, on the other hand, issued threats even at the highest levels. Nawaz Sharif was the first to make a 
veiled threat. On May 27, 1999, he stated: “Last year’s [1998] nuclear tests have given Pakistan the confidence 
to counter ‘any enemy attack’…. They [the people of Pakistan] are confident for the first time in their history 
that in the eventuality of an armed attack, they will be able to meet it on equal terms.” But the threat was 
defensive and not offensive. Confidence gained from the 1998 nuclear tests could be used by Pakistan only 
against any attack on it by India and not vice versa. 
Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Shamsad Ahmad was the second to issue another veiled threat on the use of 
nuclear weapons. On May 30 he warned: “We [Pakistan] will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal to 
defend our territorial integrity.”137  
Was it just rhetoric or a real threat? Did Pakistan ever contemplate the use of nuclear weapons during the 
Kargil conflict? Did India ever believe that during the conflict Pakistan would really use nuclear weapons? The 
military in India and Pakistan, who were either a part of the conflict or witnessed it from close quarters, do not 
believe that there was ever a nuclear threat during the crisis.138 The alarm was raised first in the United States. 
According to Bruce Riedel, the day before Sharif arrived in the United States for the meeting with Clinton at 
Blair House on July 4, “More information developed about the escalating military situation in the area—
disturbing evidence that the Pakistanis were preparing their nuclear arsenals for possible deployment.”139 
Many inside the Clinton administration believed that India and Pakistan were close to nuclear exchange during 
the Kargil conflict. According to Riedel, “The United States was alarmed from the beginning of the conflict 
because of its potential for escalation…The nuclear scenario was obviously very much in our minds.”140 In that 
crucial meeting of July 4, 1999, Sandy Berger, according to Riedel, opened the session by “telling the President 
that this could be the most important foreign policy meeting of his Presidency because the stakes could include 
a nuclear war.”141 Later a “senior” official in the Clinton administration was quoted as saying that the conflict 
in Kargil “could have escalated out of control…[and] could have brought in nuclear weapons, without either 
party deciding that it wanted to go to nuclear war.”142 
India’s response to the nuclear threat from Pakistan was measured. It downplayed the nuclear threats, while 
issuing adequate counter responses. The Times of India noted: “Common sense suggested that the remark be 
discounted. A country resorting to nuclear blackmail is not likely to make its foreign secretary the mouthpiece 
                                                           
136 V.R. Raghavan, “Strategic Pointers from Kargil,” The Hindu, June 28, 1999. 
137 “Pakistan May Use Any Weapons: Shamshad,” The News, May 31, 1999. 
138 This belief was expressed in personal interviews and discussions conducted by the author with retired military personnel 
from India and Pakistan. It is surprising and encouraging to find the faith that each side has with respect to the other over the 
use of nuclear weapons. The underlining argument is that both sides perceive the other side as “crazy enough” to go for war, 
but not “crazier enough” to use nuclear weapons. 
139 Bruce Riedel was the Special Assistant to President Bill Clinton and Senior Director for Near East and South Asia 
Affairs in the National Security Council when the crisis took place. He was present along with Ambassador Karl Inderfurth 
and Strobe Talbott when the meeting between Clinton and Sharif took place on July 4, 1999. See Bruce Riedel, “American 
Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Policy Paper Series (Center for the Advanced Study of India, 
University of Pennsylvania), 8.  
140 Riedel, “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit,” 3-4. 
141 Ibid., 8. 
142 John Lancaster, “Kashmir Crisis Was Defused on the Brink of War,” Washington Post, July 26, 1999. 
Limited War with Pakistan 33 
  
for the threat.”143 In retrospect, Shaukat Qadir believed that during the conflict “war, let alone nuclear war, was 
never a possibility.”144 Except for some background reports in the United States, it appears there was no 
credible threat of the use of nuclear weapons during the conflict. 
Besides nuclear weapons, there were suspicions about the potential use of chemical weapons. Both India 
and Pakistan suspected that the other would use chemical weapons. After recovering gas masks from Pakistan’s 
Northern Light Infantry soldiers fighting in Kargil, India feared that the infiltrators had planned to use chemical 
weapons.145 However, Indian army spokesman Col Bikram Singh stated that they had “not found any evidence” 
of chemical weapons, but believed they could have had chemical weapons as the Indian army had recovered 
masks from the infiltrators.146 
Pakistan also feared that the Indian army was using chemical weapons; it sent shells landing in its territory 
for chemical tests.147 India is believed to have used napalm. Quoting an official, one newspaper report stated 
that the MiG-27s were used to drop “500 kg fuel-air explosive (napalm) bombs on suspected hideouts in Batalik 
sector.”148 A news report from Pakistan asserted that India was using “weapons akin to ‘nerve gas bombs’ 
against Kashmiri Mujahideen.”149 
Objectives: Limited or not? 
What were the objectives of India and Pakistan before and during the Kargil conflict? And how did they each 
perceive the objectives of the other? What were the different political and military objectives? Were they 
limited?  
How did India see the Kargil conflict, in terms of Pakistan’s objectives? According to a news report, based on 
intelligence inputs, Kargil was to be a three-phased plan. It stated: 
During the first phase, which is the boldest, Islamabad is seeking separation of the Kashmir valley 
from Ladakh. Simultaneously, it is making a concerted effort to entrench itself along the fulcrum of 
Chorbatla and Turtuk, northeast of Kargil. In the second phase, it has visualized sending in troops 
through the Chorbatla pass, northeast of river Indus. From here its forces could begin a thrust through 
the “funnel” of Turtuk along the Shyok river to Khalsar where it meets the Nubra river. India’s hold 
over Siachen would then become untenable. In the third and final stage, Pakistan would seek to 
consolidate itself and completely de-link Ladakh from the rest of India incrementally.150 
The predominant belief in India on the objectives of Pakistan’s infiltration was based on the above lines—
that Pakistan wanted to cut the NH-1A, which passes through Kargil from Srinagar to Leh. By doing so, 
Pakistan would be able to cut the supply lines to Indian troops in Siachen, making the Indian hold over Siachen 
difficult.151 This in turn would “achieve a better bargaining position for a possible trade-off against the positions 
held by India in Siachen.”152 
The second belief was that Pakistan wanted to internationalize the Kashmir issue by involving the United 
Nations and other major powers.153  
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The third was to “give a fillip to militancy in Jammu and Kashmir by military action designated to weaken 
the counter insurgency grid by drawing away troops from the Valley to Kargil. It would also give a boost to the 
morale of the militants in the Valley.”154 
In retrospect, it appears that the main objectives of Pakistan in initiating the conflict were the second and 
third ones, while the first was meant to be a part of its strategy. During the conflict, Pakistan repeatedly asked 
for the involvement of the international community so as to find a solution to Kashmir.155 The primary objective 
of Pakistan in Kargil was to internationalize Kashmir and a corollary of this objective was to provoke India to 
retaliate, so that Kashmir would become a nuclear flash point and thereby get internationalized. Three factors 
figured in Pakistan’s attempt to internationalize Kashmir at this juncture in 1999—the internal situation in 
Kashmir, which was improving slowly but steadily; general international response to Kashmir; and implications 
of any improved Indo-Pak relations on Kashmir.156  
After elections in 1998, the situation inside Kashmir began returning to normalcy, irrespective of 
occasional violent incidents. Cinema halls were opened in Srinagar after nine years; tourism was picking up; 
industrial houses inside India were willing to invest in the Kashmir Valley; and the Pandits were thinking about 
returning to their homeland.157 Local support for militancy was on the decline and most of the militants were 
non-Kashmiris.158 At the international level, all major powers, including the United States, Russia, China, and 
France, were in favor of resolving Kashmir at a bilateral level.159 It was clear to Pakistan that unless something 
dramatic was done, militancy might die a natural death in Kashmir.  
The military leadership in Pakistan, according to Shaukat Qadir, based its arguments for an operation in 
Kargil on the same. According to Qadir, during November-December 1998, Sharif was presented with the 
argument that “the freedom struggle in Kashmir needed a fillip, which could be provided by an incursion into 
these temporarily unoccupied territories” in the Kargil area.160  
According to Qadir, the political and military objectives of Pakistan’s Kargil policy were the following:  
The political aim underpinning the operation was “to seek a just and permanent solution to the 
Kashmir issue in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir.” However the military aim that 
preceded the political aim was “to create a military threat that could be viewed as capable of leading to 
a military solution, so as to force India to the negotiating table from a position of weakness.”161 
The objective of Pakistan in initiating the conflict at Kargil was neither territorial nor military; rather, it 
was political. Revival of militancy in Kashmir, thereby keeping the Kashmir issue alive at bilateral and 
international levels, was the main objective of the infiltration. Holding the Kargil heights was a tactic, and thus 
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not the objective of the plan. Interdicting the NH-1A was another tactic and it is doubtful whether the Pakistani 
military really believed that they could do so without escalating the conflict.  
The strategic objectives, tactics, and terrain were chosen carefully by the planners of the Kargil infiltration, 
in order that the entire conflict would be kept limited without escalating into an open conflict between India and 
Pakistan. Clearly, it was a limited conflict, if not limited war, that the planners had in mind. 
The strategic objectives, as seen earlier, were political and limited. They were aimed at internationalizing 
the Kashmir issue by giving a fillip to militancy in the Kashmir Valley. The tactics, too, were limited. Pakistan 
was well aware that any explicit involvement of its regular troops was tantamount to an open war, and hence 
chance of its escalation. If troops belonging to either its army or paramilitary were to be involved, then it would 
give India a free hand to cross over the LoC, as it would be considered an act of war. It would also exert 
enormous pressure on Pakistan at the international level. Ultimately, though none of the major countries 
believed that the infiltrators were mujahideen, during the initial period Pakistan was able to hoodwink the 
international community that its troops were not party to the operations. Pakistan was also able to mobilize 
internal support for the operations, as many Pakistanis believed that the infiltrators were in fact mujahideen who 
were fighting the Indian oppression with a renewed vigor and a new strategy. It is doubtful whether the 
Pakistanis would have seen the infiltration and the subsequent conflict favorably if they knew it was their troops 
that were fighting in Kargil. Also it was doubtful whether Sharif would have ever agreed to such an operation. 
If the Lahore declaration, the Mishra-Naik negotiations, and Sharif’s frantic efforts towards the end of June 
1999 are taken into account, one can safely conclude that he was genuine towards reaching an agreement on 
Kashmir with Vajpayee.  
There was no plan to hold the heights permanently by the Pakistani infiltrators. Holding the heights was a 
tactic to highlight the Kashmir issue; hence Pakistan decided to vacate once the objective was achieved. While 
no one could undermine the efforts taken by the Indian military and their sacrifices, Pakistan could have 
increased casualties to a considerable level and prolonged the conflict, by continuing logistical support for the 
infiltration. Though India succeeded in recapturing a major chunk of the occupied peaks, as of July 5, the 
conflict was not over. 
At no time did Pakistan want to expand the conflict. It was focused only on Kargil. There is no reason to 
believe that the planners ever thought of using nuclear weapons. The occasional threat of use of nuclear 
weapons, as has been discussed earlier, was a political stunt and was never real.  
 
Table 2.6: Pakistan and the Kargil Conflict 
 
 Nature Notes/Remarks 
Strategic Objectives Limited To internationalize Kashmir 
To revive militancy in Kashmir, which was declining by 1998 
Tactics Limited To call for international mediation 
To call for UN intervention 
To hold a few peaks in Kargil sector 
To force India to retaliate 
To limit India’s response inside Indian side of the LoC 
Manpower Limited Involved 1,000-1,500 regular troops, with approximately 4,000 
support troops, in the guise of mujahideen 
Few mujahideen providing logistic support 
Terrain Limited Focused only on four sectors—Mushkoh Valley, Dras, Kaksar 
and Batalik 
Weapons Limited Machine guns, artillery, Stinger and Anza missiles 
Duration  Limited The infiltration was not aimed at capturing the peaks and 
altering the LoC in Pakistan’s favor 
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Civilian Control Limited Though Sharif was told about the operation, he was never 
briefed on the intensity and nature of it. It was an army 
adventure. 
The military gave up in the last week of June after realizing 
that its plan had in fact backfired and that at the international 
level it had been isolated. 
Achievements/Failures Limited Kargil was internationalized instead of Kashmir 
Militancy was revived in Jammu and Kashmir 
Led to a military coup in Pakistan 
 
Why Kargil? 
Kargil was chosen as a terrain for specific reasons. Why should the infiltration be undertaken in Kargil and not 
in Baramulla, Rajouri, or Poonch sectors? It is essential to understand that militancy has an element of local 
support in these other regions. The Kargil region has never witnessed any militancy and, in terms of ethnic 
composition and their attitude towards an independent Kashmir, the Muslims of Kargil are different from the 
Muslims in the Kashmir Valley. The majority in Kargil are Shia muslims and have never been a part of the 
militant or azadi movement that is centered in the Valley.  
Kargil was chosen for infiltration for many reasons. First, the topography of Kargil was promising. 
According the Lt. Gen. Raghavan: 
This [Kargil] is the only sector on the Line of Control (LoC) where Pakistani posts have an advantage 
of higher positions. Elsewhere on the LoC, they are at a disadvantage since the dominating heights are 
held by the Indian military.162 
The second important factor was Indian patrolling. The areas that were occupied by the infiltrators were 
considered “unheld” by the Indian military establishment. Lieutenant General Kishan Pal, Commander of 15 
Corps, is on record saying that the ground occupied by the infiltrators was of little strategic importance. His 
argument was, 
If I don’t take notice of them, it will make no difference. If they come off the heights in the summer, 
they will be slaughtered. And if they don’t leave them in the winter, they will freeze to death.163 
Third, Pakistan chose to infiltrate Kargil in anticipation of the political and military pressure on India and 
its response. In other words, the political significance of the terrain was important. The planners were well 
aware that while creating enough political and military pressure on India, occupation of heights in Kargil would 
also make sure that the political and military response would be mild. More importantly, India would not 
escalate the level of conflict beyond a limited extent. Had the same plan been executed in the Baramulla or 
Poonch sectors, India’s response would have been severe. In terms of topography, patrolling, and political 
sensitivity, an infiltration in these regions would have witnessed an escalation that could not have been 
controlled by the planners. Though prepared for air strikes and therefore armed with Stinger and Anza missiles, 
Pakistan actually never expected India to use air power. This could be gauged from Shaukat Qadir’s explanation 
from his point of view on the use of air power by India in Kargil. According to him: 
Within a few days, on May 28 two MIGs were shot down by Pakistan. The following day Pakistan shot 
down two helicopters. The Indians’ lack of success had nothing to do with the effort, but rather the 
nature of terrain, which ensured that bombing had little chance of working unless it was laser guided—
the only kind that could be accurate in this terrain. Since this terrain also made it impossible for the 
Indians to put troops on the ground, they tried using helicopters, which forced them to expose 
themselves.164 
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A fourth reason for the choice of Kargil was the timing. Occupation, detection, and counter-offensive 
provided an adequate timeframe in the Kargil area for a sustained escalation, which could then be controlled. 
Infiltration could have started some time during April 1999. According to Qadir, it was in March 1999 that “the 
leadership of the army was apprised of the operation and the Military Operations (MO) Directorate in GHQ 
[general headquarters] was tasked to evolve a strategic operational plan.”165 The infiltrators began occupying 
the heights in April 1999 and built bunkers. They were detected by a shepherd during the first week of May and 
confirmed by the Indian army during the second week of May. As seen earlier, it took time for India to realize 
the extent of infiltration and mobilize its troops accordingly. The escalation thus was gradual, and only Kargil 
could have given this slow escalation trajectory to the planners of infiltration. During this slow escalation, 
Pakistan attempted to internationalize Kashmir, as seen earlier, and also warned India that escalation of war to 
the other side was not acceptable.  
In retrospect, this slow escalation trajectory would not have been available to Pakistan, had it planned the 
infiltration elsewhere. And it was essential for Pakistan to have this slow response, so that it could make 
political maneuvers at national, bilateral, and international levels. 
  
Table 2.7: Pakistan’s Expectation of Indian Response 
 
Indian Response Expected Nature Expectation/Remarks 
Use of Manpower Limited Since the Indian military is tied down in Kashmir already, 
India would not mobilize more troops in Kargil. The fear of 
revived militancy would force India to maintain its troop level 
inside the valley 
 
Threat of an all out-war would keep India from moving all of 
its troops 
Use of Weapons Limited The terrain is unfavorable. India would use mainly its artillery  
Use of Air Force Minimal The terrain is unfavorable for the use of the air force without 
crossing the LoC 
Use of Diplomacy Minimal India would fail to convince the international community on 
the nature of infiltrators 
Internal Political 
Support 
Minimal The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) would not be able muster 
enough strength to fight an all-out war with Pakistan 




Internationalization would favor Pakistan, as the international 
community would force India to reach a consensus on 
Kashmir 
 
Communication during Kargil  
How much communication was there between India and Pakistan at the highest political and military levels 
during the conflict? 
It is unfortunate that the political leadership at the highest level between India and Pakistan suspended their 
communication during the crisis period. The first major meeting took place between Sartaj Aziz and Jaswant 
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Singh, Pakistani and Indian foreign ministers, respectively, on June 12. The meeting failed when both India and 
Pakistan saw the other sticking to their points.166 
Who Fought from Pakistan’s Side? 
It was essential to analyze who the infiltrators were. Initially India thought that they were mujahideen who were 
provided with support by the Pakistan army. Until the last week of May 1999, it was believed that the 
infiltrators were Afghan mujahideen. Towards the end of May, India realized that the infiltrators also included 
Pakistani soldiers. On May 26, an official of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs stated that the operations 
involved both Pakistan army regulars and mercenaries.167 In a statement made on June 1, Fernandes announced, 
“All those who have been pushed into our territory by the Pakistani side, including Pakistani troops, should go 
back across the LoC.”168  
Towards the end of the first week of June, Indian perceptions of the infiltrators changed. It now saw most 
of the intruders as Pakistani regulars.169 In the first week of June, the Indian army started releasing evidence 
clearly pointing to the involvement of Pakistani soldiers. On June 5, the Indian army released documents of the 
deceased and identified their names and identity cards.170 By the second week of June, the Indian army believed 
that three battalions of Pakistani regular troops were involved in the conflict. It found the 3rd, 4th, and 6th 
Battalions of the Northern Light Infantry, along with the Special Services Group, were involved.171 Towards the 
end of the conflict, the Indian military stated that the infiltrators were composed of Pakistani regulars and not 
mujahideen. Gen V.P. Malik was quoted as saying that, based on evidence recovered from the bodies, the 
infiltrators were regulars from the Pakistan army and not mujahideen.172 
Looking at the conflict in retrospect, according to an independent assessment based on the various captured 
documents, interrogation reports and personal interviews, the infiltrators “were created from four Northern 
Light Infantry battalions and two companies of the Special Services Group (SSG).”173 
The government of Pakistan vehemently denied any presence of its troops, especially in the initial period. It 
continuously emphasized that the infiltrators were actually mujahideen. The public at large believed during the 
conflict that it was the mujahideen who occupied the Kargil heights.174 One unknown militant outfit based in 
Pakistan, Tehrik-i-Jihad, even claimed responsibility for the infiltration.175 It even asserted later that it was 
sending more fighters to “make our position stable.”176 Later, the Lashkar-e-Toiba also claimed that its cadres 
were fighting in Kargil and it was even reported in the Washington Post  that it conducted training on high 
altitude warfare for its cadres.177 An independent analyst, who worked with the Indian intelligence earlier, 
doubted that the infiltrators could be the followers of Osama bin Laden.178 There were also news reports 
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units of the Special Services Group and elements of supporting arms and services of the Pakistan army have been identified 
in the pockets of intrusion.” See “Three Pak Battalions Active in Kargil Hills,” The Asian Age, June 16, 1999. 
172 “Kargil Wholly Pak Army’s Deed: Gen Malik,” The Times of India, July 19, 1999. 
173 See Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna, “The Kargil War,” in Kargil: The Tables Turned, eds. Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna and P.R. 
Chari, (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2001): 100-101. According to Maj. Gen. Krishna, the four groups include 4 NLI 
(located in Gilgit), 6 NLI (Skardu), 5 NLI (Minimarg) and 3 NLI (Dansam). 
174 See the following articles for the general perception about the infiltrators in Pakistan. Syed Alamdar Raza, “Balance of 
Power in Kashmir,” The News, June 3, 1999; Khalid Mehmud, “The Kargil Scenario,” The News, June 3, 1999; M.S. Qazi, 
“High Tempers at High Mountains,” The Frontier Post, June 7, 1999; Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, “Kargil Conflict and 
beyond,” The Frontier Post, June 5, 1999; and Tanvir Ahmad Khan, “Managing the Kargil Crisis,” Dawn, June 8, 1999. 
175 “Pak Based Militant Outfit Men in Kargil,” The Hindu, May 24, 1999. 
176 “Mujahideens in Kargil Safe: Tehrik-e-Jihad,” The News, May 27, 1999. 
177 “Lashkar Conducted High-altitude Training for Infiltrators,” The Hindu, June 8, 1999. 
178 Even the government of India and its army did not share this perception. According to a former intelligence official, “It is 
likely that the ISI found a convenient way out of this dilemma by helping bin Laden and his followers escape from FATA to 
the Kargil area through the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) and set up a fresh sanctuary in Indian territory, with the 
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suggesting that Osama bin Laden was closely working with Pakistan’s government to push his Islamic fighters 
into Kargil.179 The British and German intelligence agencies were quoted as having reported bin Laden’s 
involvement in Kargil.180 
At a later stage, analysts in Pakistan and even the government of Pakistan started accepting, both directly 
and indirectly, that Pakistani regulars were involved. According to Shaukat Qadir, “the occupants (in Kargil) 
were essentially the soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI), there were some local mujahideen assisting 
as labour to carry logistical requirements.”181  
 
Table 2.8: Kargil as a Limited War: The Final Tally 
 
 India Pakistan 
Areas of Engagement Mushkoh Valley, Dras, Kaksar, and 
Batalik sectors, covering an area of 130 
to 150 sq km, covering around 150 km 
of the LoC with a depth ranging from 
seven to fifteen kms from the LoC on 
Indian side 
None 
Number of Troops 
Engaged 
20,000 1,000-1,500 (regular troops) 
4,000 (providing logistic support) 




Use of Weapons Machine guns, Bofors guns 
 
 
MiG-21s, MiG-27s, Mirage 2000 and 
Mi-17 helicopters 
Stinger and Anza missiles; machine 
guns 
Helicopters 
Duration 74 days 74 days 
Objectives To clear intrusion To internationalize Kashmir 
To give a fillip to militancy in Jammu 
and Kashmir 
Results Limited success:  
1. India succeeded in driving out the 
infiltrators. LoC got strengthened 
internationally 
 
2. Failed to curb militancy, which got 
revived with an added ferocity, in 
Jammu and Kashmir  
Limited failure along with limited 
success:  
1. Internationalized Kashmir, but not 
according to its wishes; LoC got 
reaffirmed 
2. Revived militancy in Jammu and 
Kashmir 
3. Resulted in army taking over power 
in the long run 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
logistic and firepower backing of the Pakistani army.” See B. Raman, “The Portents of Kargil,” Security and Political Risk 
Analysis (SAPRA) India, http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/military/img_1999_05 _001.html. Also see B. Raman, “Is 
Osama bin Laden in Kargil?” The Indian Express, May 26, 1999. 
179 “Bin Laden Worked in Tandem with Pak to Push Infiltrators,” Hindustan Times, June 15, 1999. 
180 “German Intelligence Says Osama Is Involved in Kashmir Crisis,” The Asian Age, June 16, 1999. 
181 Qadir, “An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict,” 26. 
40 Suba Chandran 
  
To conclude, three factors contributed to the emergence of the concept of limited war with Pakistan. First 
was the continuing political deadlock between both countries, which could not sustain a political dialogue for a 
longer period due to various internal and external factors. Pakistan could not be politically pressured to reach an 
understanding with India. 
A second factor that contributed to the emergence of the limited war concept in India was the continuing 
militancy in Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan’s support towards the same. India’s efforts either bilaterally or 
through exerting pressure on the international community to prevent Pakistan from supporting militancy did not 
yield any tangible results. 
With political efforts not yielding the desirable results and with militancy continuing in Jammu and 
Kashmir, how was India going to put pressure on Pakistan especially from supporting militancy in Jammu and 
Kashmir and reach an acceptable compromise? How would India respond to Pakistan’s proxy war without 
increasing the bilateral conflict into an all-out war? The concept of limited war emerged as a possible option. 
The advocates believe that such a military option would convey India’s seriousness in combating Pakistan-
sponsored militancy. Besides, the advocates also believe that such a limited military response would keep the 
war limited to Jammu and Kashmir and would not spread along the international border. 
While the first two factors contributed to the emergence of the concept of limited war in India, it was the 
third factor—the Kargil War, which made India realize that a limited war along the LoC is possible. As has 
been discussed, the Kargil War in fact was a limited confrontation in every sense. Irrespective of occasional 
threats to enlarge the war either in terms of using bigger weapons, including nuclear weapons, and enlarging the 
theater of operations, the Kargil War remained limited.  
If Pakistan could initiate and finalize a limited war on Indian soil, could the latter repeat the same on the 
former’s soil? The advocates in India of limited war believe that India could wage a limited war vis-à-vis 




Is There Sufficient “Space”? 
The Space for Limited War: Indian Perceptions  
Kargil is considered an example of limited war by its advocates in India. Based on the outcome of Kargil, these 
advocates of limited war argue that India could fight such a war and eventually win it. According to George 
Fernandes: 
India’s success [in Kargil] was due to the ability of our defence forces to fight and win such a limited 
war at a time, ground and means of fighting chosen by the aggressor. If India can beat a professional 
military force equipped with modern fire power, at the ground (with Pakistani forces on dominating 
heights) and time of Pakistani choice with the initiatives also in their hands, then India can beat 
Pakistan anytime, anywhere.1 
The advocates in India of limited war against Pakistan base their arguments on the following: 
• Under the nuclear umbrella, there exists a space to conduct a limited war with Pakistan. 
• The political, economic, and human costs of the use of a nuclear weapon would prohibit both India and 
Pakistan from considering the use of nuclear weapons in any limited conflicts with each other. 
• India is aware of the limits short of full-scale conflict to which Pakistan can be pushed in a limited war 
situation. 
• US pressure on Pakistan, during any limited conflict situation, would constrain the latter from either 
expanding the conflict or from converting it into a large-scale conventional war. 
• The fear of massive Indian retaliation, in case of a Pakistani first nuclear strike, would deter the latter 
from exploring the nuclear option. 
Is the Space Sufficient? 
How far are the above-mentioned assertions true? Indian theories of limited war are to a great extent founded on 
the same consensus that the limited war theorists of the United States had in the 1950s and ‘60s. But 
unfortunately, the “rough consensus” amongst the American theorists during that period was based on “logical 
speculation and inference, shaped more by politics and psychology than by science and evidence; and therefore 
the claims of competing strategic objectives and theories are free to reassert themselves in new forms that are 
always plausible in logic and unverifiable in practice.”2 Invariably, Indian theories of limited war are also based 
on the same logical speculation and inference and shaped by politics and psychology, rather than by any science 
and evidence. 
Space under the Nuclear Umbrella 
First, the proponents believe that there exists a space under nuclear deterrence to conduct a limited war with 
Pakistan. According to George Fernandes, nuclear weapons “can deter only the use of nuclear weapons, but not 
all and any war” and under the nuclear shadow, a “conventional war remained feasible though with definite 
limitations if escalation across the nuclear threshold was to be avoided.”3 In a conference organized by the 
Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) at New Delhi in January 2000, he stated: “Nuclear weapons 
did not make war obsolete. They simply impose another dimension of the way warfare could be conducted. The 
Kargil War was therefore handled within this perspective with obvious results.”4 
                                                           
1 George Fernandes, “The Dynamics of Limited War,” Strategic Affairs, http://www.stratmag.com/issueOct-15/ page07.htm 
. 
2 Robert E. Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 9. 
3 “Fernandes Unveils ‘Limited War’ Doctrine,” The Hindu, January 25, 2000. 
4 Fernandes, “The Dynamics of Limited War.” 
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According to Jasjit Singh, another proponent of limited war theory, “Nuclear weapons have limited the 
aim, scope, and extent of war among states that possess such capabilities because of the tremendously 
destructive potential of such weapons.”5 Elsewhere he has also stressed that “the question that defence planners 
must ask themselves is: what implication does the nuclear factor have on conventional wars—and therefore, on 
the force structure that is needed for the future? The answer is fairly clear: the need is to prepare for a limited 
war.”6 There is a general belief among the proponents that “since the onset of nuclearization has rendered ‘total 
war’ unthinkable, ‘Limited War’ must of necessity be central to the military input into decision making.”7 
What role do nuclear weapons play in Indo-Pak conflicts? Have they been a source of stability in crisis 
situations between India and Pakistan? What role did they play in the previous crisis situations? Because the 
nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan have been acknowledged since the second half of the 1980s, an 
analysis of the role of nuclear weapons in major crisis situations would be essential to find out whether nuclear 
weapons are a source of stability and provide adequate space for a limited war. Second, it is also essential to 
analyze the nature of Indo-Pak deterrence, as the space under the nuclear umbrella is based on the belief that the 
deterrence between India and Pakistan is functional.  
Weapons of Stability or Instability?: Nuclear Weapons and Indo-Pak Crises  
The first major Indo-Pak crisis since both countries were widely acknowledged as developing nuclear weapons 
was that of Brasstacks in December 1986. But even before, since the beginning of the 1980s, there were a 
number of threats about the development or use of nuclear weapons, or about attacking the nuclear installations 
of the other. Also, there has been a lot of rhetoric from the scientific and military establishment on the use and 
development of nuclear weapons and nuclear signaling towards the other. The beginning of the 1980s was 
crucial to the development of differing threat perceptions and the emphasis on nuclear weapons in facing those 
threats between India and Pakistan. Bilateral, regional, and international strategic environments shaped the 
threat perceptions. When the 1980s began, India was aware of the close relationship between China and 
Pakistan and how the former aided the latter in developing a nuclear weapons program. India was also aware of 
the changed US non-proliferation interests, with the Reagan administration replacing that of Jimmy Carter. The 
presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan made Pakistan a frontline state again, bringing cold war politics to the 
subcontinent again. The return of Indira Gandhi to power in India also meant the end of the short-lived non-
proliferation policies of the Janata government.  
The first major threat was created through a newspaper report in the United States in December 1982. The 
report appeared in the Washington Post and suggested that India was planning to attack the uranium plant at 
Kahuta in March 1982.8 According to the report:  
India’s military leaders have prepared a contingency plan for a preemptive strike against Pakistan 
nuclear facilities and proposed such an attack to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi earlier this year, 
according to US intelligence sources. Gandhi decided against carrying out an attack, when she first 
heard the proposal nine months ago, but did not foreclose the option of striking if Pakistan appeared on 
the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons capability, the sources said.9 
How true was the threat of Indian preemptive attack on the Kahuta plant in March 1982? Was India really 
planning to attack? It is essential to understand the regional security context in which this report appeared in the 
newspaper. The conflict in Afghanistan had reached its peak in 1982 and the United States had been pressuring 
India and Pakistan to reach an understanding between them so as to remove the Pakistani fears of fighting a war 
on two fronts. Between April 1981 and June 1982, India and Pakistan were engaged in an attempt to reach an 
understanding on signing a treaty or agreement.10 The Indian government denied the Washington Post report, 
calling it “totally false and unfounded” and “absolute rubbish.”11  
                                                           
5 Jasjit Singh, “Dynamics of Limited War,” Strategic Analysis (October 2000):1206. 
6 Jasjit Singh, “Budgeting for Security Needs,” Frontline 15, no. 15 (July 31, 1998).  
7 Firdaus Ahmed, “The Impetus behind Limited War,” Peace and Conflict 6, no. 2 (2003): 5. 
8 Milton R. Benjamin, “India Said to Eye Raid on Pakistan’s A-plants,” The Washington Post, December 20, 1982. 
9 Ibid. 
10 In April 1981, Pakistan suggested “mutual guarantees of non-aggression and non-use of force, in the spirit of the Simla 
Agreement,” which was formally presented to the Indian government during the same year. India in reply proposed a seven 
point aide-memoire. Based on the Indian government’s reply, Pakistan revised the proposals in June 1982. See Suba 
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George Perkovich, in his colossal study on India’s nuclear bomb, quotes many former Indian military, 
political, and nuclear officials on the negative impact of such an attack. He quotes two officials. According to 
the first, “The question was what will happen next? In my estimate, Pakistan would go to war. The international 
community would condemn us for doing something in peacetime, which the Israelis would get away with but 
India would not be able to get away with. In the end, it will result in war.” Another official was quoted as 
saying, “We have Muslims in India…If we cooperated with the Israelis in attacking Pakistan, it would be a huge 
political disaster and could cause severe internal problems.”12 Nevertheless, the fact that India purchased 
Jaguars in the 1980s, which had the capability to bomb the Kahuta plants, has been interpreted as an Indian 
strategy to attack it.  
Though the issue of attacking Kahuta quickly died in 1982, it surfaced again in 1984, once again through 
media reports. The Wall Street Journal interviewed Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani 
President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq in July 1984. The first interview, with Indira Gandhi, was published on July 
5. It was followed by the second, with Zia ul-Haq, published on July 10, 1984. Earlier, Senator Alan Cranston 
had submitted a report that Pakistan was engaged actively in a nuclear weapons program. According to the 
report on Indira Gandhi’s interview, 
Asked whether, if there were conclusive proof of imminent nuclear capability in Pakistan, she would 
consider air strikes against Pakistan facilities such as those Israel launched against an Iraqi nuclear 
facility, she pondered a moment and said. “I don’t know. We’ve never thought of it really.13 
The same reporters who interviewed Indira Gandhi and asked the question on whether she would consider 
attacking Pakistan’s nuclear assets interviewed Zia. They had posed the same question to Zia, as could be 
judged from his answer: “It is a possibility. Pakistan stands the risk of its very innocent, modest facility being 
subjected to an air attack by India…It is a possibility we are hoping will not materialize.”14 The third media 
report on the subject appeared in the New York Times on September 15, 1984. Commenting on a CIA brief to 
the Senate on Pakistan’s uranium enrichment, the news report stated:  
The CIA told the Senate committee, according to two members, that it had learned from a sensistive 
intelligence source, that Mrs. Gandhi received recommendations this year [1984] from some senior 
aides that India attack the Kahuta plant to make sure that the enrichment process was not used for the 
development of weapons.15 
One main reason for the renewal of this debate was what Abdul Qadeer Khan had told Nawa-i-Waqt, in an 
interview in February 1984 regarding Pakistan’s enrichment capacity. Speaking cryptically, Khan said,  
Pakistan has broken the monopoly on the enrichment of uranium…If in the interest of the country’s 
solidarity the President of Pakistan were in extreme need and gave the team of scientists an important 
mission, it would not disappoint the nation.16  
Did this statement create enormous threat perceptions in India? Was there an effort from the Indian side to 
attack the nuclear enrichment plants after Khan’s interview? How did the policy makers view the statement by 
Khan on Pakistan’s nuclear enrichment status? R. Venkataraman, the defense minister of India, was quoted 
responding to the questions in Parliament on the statements made by Dr. Khan:  
You need not match the tank with the tank and this and that…All that I am bound to do is to take note 
of such a situation and then make arrangements for meeting a contingency of that kind…I want to 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Chandran, “Indo-Pak Summits: A Profile,” in India and Pakistan: Agra Summit and After, eds. P.R. Chari and Suba 
Chandran (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2001), 1. 
11 William Claiborne, “India Denies Plan to Hit Pakistani Nuclear Plants,” The Washington Post, December 21, 1982. 
12 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1999), 240-241. 
13 Karen Elliott House and Peter R. Kann, “Amid a Host of Problems, Indira Gandhi Remains Serene about the State of 
India,” The Wall Street Journal, July 5, 1984. 
14 Karen Elliott House and Peter R. Kann, “Zia Says Pakistan Has No Plans for Nuclear Bomb,” The Wall Street Journal, 
July 10, 1984. 
15 Philip Taubman, “Worsening India-Pakistan Ties Worry US,” The New York Times, September 15, 1984. 
16 “Pakistani Cites Nuclear Advance,” The New York Times, February 10, 1984. 
44 Suba Chandran 
  
make it clear that it is the definite, determined and express policy of the Government to use nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes.17  
It is clear from the above that there were no attempts to attack the nuclear plants of Pakistan by the political 
establishment in India. The Indian military planners may have brought to the attention of the political leadership 
the various alternatives that India might pursue, in addition to specific policy options that India could adopt in 
case Pakistan drew closer to manufacturing nuclear weapons. These were options for emergency situations and 
by no means deliberate policies of the Indian government. Indira Gandhi simply rejected these options, not 
because she was a peacemonger, but due to the implications of such a policy. Thus, these episodes lead to a 
conclusion that the options may have been presented to the political leadership of India, but there were never 
serious efforts to pursue them. The threat of attack on the Pakistani nuclear installation by India was based on 
hype created and sustained by the media.   
While the nuclear advocates in India and Pakistan downplayed these events in later studies, the nuclear 
opponents dramatized them. These incidents surprisingly were considered as part of those “six wars that never 
happened.”18 
The next major nuclear crisis in South Asia supposedly took place in 1990. In his famous article published 
in 1993, Seymour Hersh details the crisis as follows: 
Sometime in the early spring of 1990, intelligence that was described as a hundred percent reliable— 
perhaps as NSA intercept—reached Washington with the ominous news that General Beg had 
authorized the technicians at Kahuta to put together nuclear weapons. Such intelligence, of “smoking 
gun” significance, was too precise to be ignored or shunted aside. The new intelligence also indicated 
that General Beg was prepared to use the bomb against India if necessary. Precisely what was obtained 
could not be learned, but one American summarized the information as being, in essence, a warning to 
India that if “you move up here”—that is, begin a ground invasion into Pakistan— “we are going to 
take out Delhi.”19 
How accurate were Hersh’s contentions? A later study carried out by scholars from India, Pakistan, and the 
United States asserted: 
Our assessment, after conversations with a large number of American, Pakistani and Indian civilian 
officials, diplomats, military and intelligence officers is that Hersh’s account is largely inaccurate. It 
reflects the most alarmist spectrum of American views during the crisis.20 
In his work, Raj Chengappa details how the nuclear establishment in India perceived the crisis. According 
to him: 
India did take the threat of a nuclear strike seriously. The armed forces, who were not briefed either 
about India or Pakistan’s nuclear capability, were worried. V.P. Singh called S.K. Mehra, chief of air 
staff, and asked him whether the air force could intercept a Pakistani aircraft that may be sent to launch 
a nuclear strike. Mehra reportedly told him that if Pakistani jets made a “bolt from the blue” strike by 
flying at treetop level there was no way India could prevent it. Mehra recalls: “We really didn’t know 
if Pakistan’s F-16s were capable of delivering such weapons or not. Nor were we absolutely sure of 
what we had. The feeling was that we were sitting ducks. It was a worrying situation for us to be in.”21 
According to Chengappa, Prime Minister V.P. Singh feared that “Pakistan would blast a nuclear weapon 
over their own territory and then threaten us by saying the next one would fall on us. So we decided to tell 
                                                           
17 Quoted in Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, 253-54. 
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Pakistan that if they tried anything funny the damage would be devastating.”22 Singh was so serious that he 
asked scientific advisor V.S. Arunachalam “to keep everything ready for a nuclear counter attack.”23 
Another detailed study on the issue comments: 
It is also possible that Pakistani suggestions of nuclear delivery preparations were a colossal bluff. 
Without corroboration from Pakistani leaders, only a circumstantial case can be made for the claim that 
Islamabad devised a clever hoax to achieve its objectives in 1990. That evidence is compelling 
nonetheless. Pakistan certainly had a motive: it interpreted Indian deployments in Rajasthan as possible 
preparation for a massive conventional assault that could have severed the strife ridden Singh province 
from northern Pakistan. As tensions arose, Pakistani officials may have believed it necessary to do 
something dramatic to signal their deterrent resolve. Faking nuclear delivery preparations would have 
spurred the United States into action; Washington would intervene to ease the tension, or at least pass 
along its observations, who would be deterred from any aggression they might be contemplating.24 
The last crisis in which threats of the use of nuclear weapons was involved was that of the Kargil conflict, 
which has been discussed in an earlier chapter of this work. 
Nuclear Deterrence: Is It Functional? 
How do the analysts see nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan? In particular, how do the analysts in 
India and Pakistan see Indo-Pak nuclear deterrence?  
To a large extent, analysts outside India and Pakistan have been influenced predominantly by how the West 
perceived nuclear proliferation outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) fold in the 1970s. Scholars 
outside India and Pakistan who wrote on nuclear issues could be divided into three: the n-advocates, who 
viewed nuclear weapons as a source of stability; the n-opponents, who perceived nuclear weapons as a source of 
instability; and n-apartheidists, who perceived nuclear weapons a source of stability between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, but as a source of instability outside, especially in the Third World.  
The nuclear advocates base their argument on the fact that nuclear weapons act as a source of stability 
between the superpowers. Amongst these n-advocates, a sub-section has even argued that nuclear weapons may 
have the same effects and results elsewhere.25 It is even believed that nuclear weapons would provide stability 
to certain regions, which are facing chronic instability.26  
Nuclear apartheidists hold that “many of the political, technical and situational roots of stable nuclear 
deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union may be absent in South Asia, the Middle East or 
other regions to which nuclear weapons are spreading.”27 The argument continues by asserting that due to 
“heightened stakes and lessened room for maneuver in conflict-prone regions, the volatile leadership and 
political instability…and technical deficiencies,” there is “a high risk of nuclear weapons being used” outside 
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the US-Soviet nuclear belt.28 Devin Hagerty has summed up this view, analyzing a number of existing views 
and theories: “Contrary to the apparently pacifying effect of US and Soviet nuclear weapons, however, their 
wider spread is generally considered to be dangerous.”29  
Clearly nuclear apartheidists and nuclear opponents base their argument on two aspects: The political 
environment amongst rival countries in the Third World is unstable and also lacks adequate technical 
development to maintain the stability and survivability of command and control structures. Of late, there has 
also been an emphasis on nuclear assets falling into the hands of terrorists. 
It is a debatable hypothesis whether nuclear weapons in the hands of other countries are dangerous due to 
political stakes involved and the chronic instability amongst them. The history of cold war conflict would 
provide adequate examples of the high political stakes between the superpowers in Europe, Asia, and Africa. 
Hagerty’s argument is valid and appropriate on the relations between political stakes and nuclear stability. He 
writes: 
It is easy for contemporary analysts to forget the profound animosities between the United States and 
the Soviet Union during the various crises over Berlin and Cuba or between the Soviet Union and 
China during the 1960s. The political stakes in the Korean peninsula, South Asia and the Middle East 
today do not exceed those that faced the United States, the Soviet Union and China at the height of the 
cold war.30 
Besides the technical and political component of deterrence, though not explicitly stated, there is an 
element of downplaying the human component of nuclear deterrence in the Third World. Western analysts are 
also influenced by cultural factors to conclude that the political and military leadership in the developing world 
is more prone to use nuclear weapons. While there is much focus on the development of crisis situations, not 
much has been written about why and how those crises were defused.  In the case of India and Pakistan, because 
of the fact that both countries fought each other openly thrice in the past and once not so openly; had three close 
encounters in the 1980s and ‘90s; and one country is involved in aiding a militant movement in the other, there 
has been a focus on the political instability argument. But why was it that none of the three open wars were 
blown into a full-fledged war, destroying each other completely?31 Why did the three close encounters not 
develop into an open war? And what prevented the not so open conflict in 1999 and a full-scale mobilization in 
2002 from developing into open war?  
Efforts to reach a political understanding, whatever their outcome, have also been downplayed, so as to 
focus on the “unstable political environment not conducive for the presence of nuclear weapons” argument. The 
argument that nuclear weapons are a source of stability between the superpowers, but source of instability in the 
third world countries is dangerous and bogus. If political rivals in the developing world, such as India and 
Pakistan, reach an understanding, then would the apartheidists support the spread of nuclear weapons in these 
states? 
How do India and Pakistan see each other on nuclear weapons? Though there seems to be overwhelming 
support for the possession of nuclear weapons at the popular level, the support for the same is divided at the 
strategic level in both countries.  
Nuclear deterrence “requires the construction and maintenance of a retaliatory or second strike 
capability.”32 One should have a “fully deployed nuclear force…to survive a first strike designed to prevent that 
force from striking back.”33 Deterrence is dependent on two factors: the strategic reach and the survivability of a 
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retaliatory force.34 Whereas India and Pakistan both have the first, the nuclear opponents consider that the 
second is doubtful. They are uncertain of how dispersed the nuclear weapons of both countries are and, even if 
they are dispersed, it is doubtful that they would be beyond the reach of a first strike. Is this argument true? Do 
India and Pakistan have first strike capabilities? What role does “first strike” play in nuclear deterrence and 
second, what role does it play in the nuclear doctrines of India and Pakistan? 
Devin T. Hagerty argues that “first strike uncertainty will deter preemptive strikes” and for the 
“maintenance of first strike uncertainty, only a very rough equivalence is needed to ensure that one side cannot 
simply overwhelm the other in a massive attack.”35 
Hagerty based his arguments on the 1962 Cuban missile crisis in which President John F. Kennedy went 
ahead with the naval quarantine irrespective of a US air force report on survivability of Soviet nuclear 
missiles.36 He argues, “This [Cuban] episode demonstrates the implausibility of an Indian or Pakistani military 
planner convincing the political leadership that a preemptive nuclear strike would definitely succeed in 
destroying all of the other side’s nuclear war heads in a first strike.”37 
How efficient are the command and control structures of nuclear forces in India and Pakistan? While some 
believe that the system is slowly evolving, others believe that it is not fully operational.38  Given these factors, 
the dangers of the use of nuclear weapons in any crisis situation cannot be overruled. 
Finally, why should Pakistan limit a war, when it is not going in its favor? Pakistan is well aware that “in a 
showdown involving conventional warfare, Pakistan would probably be at a disadvantage. Its military has 
received no new weapons from the United States in a decade. Indigenously manufactured weapons and arms 
supplied by China might not be sufficient to effectively ward off an attack by India, which has been buying 
modern weapons on the international market from a variety of sources.”39 
Is there a possibility of a limited war between India and Pakistan escalating into a nuclear war, given the 
present level of mutual mistrust and unstable deterrence? According to Lt. Gen. V.R. Raghavan, “A limited war 
on the lines of the 1971 conflict will run serious risk of escalating to a nuclear standoff, if not a nuclear 
exchange.”40 Whether a limited war would escalate into a larger war or a nuclear war depends on the level of 
strategic stability, strategic parity, and strategic communication between India and Pakistan. As seen in the first 
chapter, these three factors played a crucial role in the limited war discourse between the then superpowers of 
the United States and Soviet Union. Rather than the presence of nuclear weapons alone, these three factors 
(which of course do have to take nuclear weapons into account) primarily provided the base for the limited war 
strategies. In the Indo-Pak context, these three factors are still elusive. 
Economic Costs to Pakistan 
Proponents of nuclear deterrence also believe that Pakistan cannot risk a total war with India, as the economic 
and political cost would be disastrous. When the limited war theory made its introduction in the Indian strategic 
calculus in 2000, the economy of Pakistan was in bad shape. However, post-September 11 events and 
Pakistan’s willingness to join the “war against terrorism,” coupled with better management of its economy, has 
made Pakistan stronger economically. 
Pakistan’s economy today is much better than it was in 1999-2000. It would be totally wrong to presume 
that Pakistan would not risk enlarging a limited conflict due to economic costs, since this presumption is based 
on conditions that have since changed significantly. 
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India Is Aware of the Red Line 
There is a strong conviction that India is well aware of the “red line,” or the limits to which conflict can be 
fought short of full-scale war, and it would not engage in pushing Pakistan in ways that could force the latter to 
use its nuclear weapons. According to K. Subrahmanyam, “The Indian armed forces are sensitive to tolerance 
limits of Pakistan and are not likely to force it into a situation when it would have to consider the use of nuclear 
weapons.”41  
There is a strong belief in India that it knows the other side; this is likewise true with Pakistan. There has 
been a lot of emphasis on the cultural, historical, and territorial factors that demonstrate how similar the 
countries are to each other. Since India and Pakistan have much in common and have been dealing with each 
other for a long time, there is a tendency to simplify the human equations. But the real question that needs to be 
looked into is, how far are these beliefs true? In other words, do Indians and Pakistanis really understand each 
other? To narrow the question, does the Indian political and military elite know the political and military elite of 
Pakistan and vice versa? In turn, does the military in each country understand each other and are they aware of 
what decision each would take in a crisis situation? Is there sufficient strategic communication between the two, 
especially during a crisis period? 
There was a strong belief in Pakistan, especially among its military leadership, about how far it could push 
India before initiating conflicts in 1965, 1971, and 1999. Ayub Khan underestimated Lal Bahadur Shastri before 
initiating military operations in Kashmir in 1965; and Pervez Musharraf underestimated Vajpayee in 1999 
before sending mujahideen and Pakistani troops to Kargil. 
Explaining the mindset inside the Pakistan army before initiating the conflict in Kargil, retired Brigadier 
Shaukat Qadir wrote: 
Given the total ratio of forces for India and Pakistan, which was about 2.25:1, the MO [Military 
Operations Directorate] concluded that the initial Indian reactions would be to rush more troops to IHK 
[Indian Held Kashmir], further eroding their offensive capabilities against Pakistan. As a consequence, 
they concluded that would not undertake an all-out offensive against Pakistan, since by doing so it 
would run the risk of ending in a stalemate, which would be viewed as a victory for Pakistan.42 
Based on his discussions with senior military officials, Qadir concluded that the political objective of 
Pakistan when it initiated the conflict was to “seek a just and permanent solution to the Kashmir issue in 
accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir” and the military objective was to “create a military threat 
that could be viewed as capable of leading to a military solution, so as to force India to the negotiating table 
from a position of weakness.”43 
Pakistan’s strategy for this limited offensive, therefore, was: 
By July (1999), the Mujahideen would step up their activities in the rear areas, threatening the Indian 
lines of communication at pre-designated targets, which would help isolate pockets, forcing the Indian 
troops to react to them. This would create an opportunity for the forces at Kargil to push forward and 
pose an additional threat. India would, as a consequence, be forced to the negotiating table.44 
The plan, which Qadir considered even retrospectively as “theoretically faultless and tactically brilliant,” 
did not pursue the path that the planners of Pakistan’s military wanted it to. To their dismay, India’s response 
was more than they had expected. Irrespective of India’s response, even by the end of June 1999, in his last 
briefing to the soon to be deposed Nawaz Sharif, General Musharraf was believed to have told the prime 
minister, “[Pakistan’s] military did not believe that India would succeed in ousting Pakistani troops from the 
posts they were holding.”45 
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Clearly, Pakistan has underestimated India’s response in the past conflicts. Has India estimated Pakistan 
correctly in the past? How long would India be in a position to pursue this restraint? If there are any serious 
terrorist attacks on India in the future, especially on symbols of significance and national pride such as 
Legislative Assembly buildings and Parliament buildings, how would India react? If there were any victims as a 
result of such terrorist attacks on persons of high political significance, would the Indian government still stick 
to its restraint policy? With most of the important decisions (including the decision to go nuclear) being 
influenced, to a certain extent, by internal factors, there is every possibility of India undertaking a hot pursuit or 
surgical strikes, which would result in considerably escalating the tensions between India and Pakistan to the 
nuclear level.  
Hence the restraint shown during the Kargil War and in the aftermath of the December 13 attack should not 
be taken for granted in a limited war situation. It should be emphasized that during the entire Kargil War, 
Pakistan did not attempt to escalate the war beyond a certain limit for various factors. Had Pakistan escalated 
the conflict, say with the introduction of more regular forces or with its air force, then the result could have been 
very different. 
The US Pressure on Pakistan 
There is a belief amongst a section in India’s strategic community that the United States would never allow 
Pakistan to expand a war or to use its nuclear weapons. According to them, “The presence of the US fleet in the 
Arabian Sea is the guarantor that nuclear weapons would not be used by Pakistan.”46 Why would the United 
States never allow Pakistan to use nuclear weapons? The argument is, “If and when Pakistan takes out its 
weapons and starts readying them for firing, the US can never be sure that some of them may not be aimed at 
the US carriers, considering the enormous resentment among the Pakistani servicemen against the US…the US, 
which is keeping Pakistan under close surveillance, will destroy the Pakistani nuclear weapons through accurate 
non-nuclear strikes. The Pakistanis know it, the Americans know it and the Indians also know it. Therefore, 
there is no risk of an Indo- Pakistani conflict with the US forces present in the Arabian Sea. It is a very different 
scenario from all four previous wars.”47  
How much leverage does the United States have over Pakistan? While in India the general belief is that the 
United States has sufficient force to pressure and deter Pakistan, events in the recent past have proved 
otherwise. Starting with the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998, it appears that the US pressure on Pakistan, 
especially over Pakistan’s military leadership, is limited. While the United States may have influence over the 
political elites of Pakistan with regard to general issues, US influence over crucial issues that Pakistan 
(irrespective of whether it is democratic or military) consider as vital for its survival is minimal. For example, 
given Pakistan’s nuclear policy, the military’s hold over national security policy, and its Kashmir policy—it is 
highly unlikely that any external force could exert sufficient pressure to alter any of these three components.  
Immediately after India’s nuclear tests in 1998, Clinton tried his best to prevent Sharif from following suit. 
According to Bruce Riedel, who was the Special Assistant to Bill Clinton and also the Senior Director for Near 
East and South Asia Affairs from 1997 to 2001: 
Clinton had spent days trying to argue Sharif out of testing in response and had offered him everything 
from a State dinner to billions in new US assistance. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Central 
Command Chief General Tony Zinni, Assistant Secretary for South Asia Rick Inderfurth and I had 
traveled to Islamabad to try to persuade him, but to no avail.48 
Before the coup that deposed Sharif in 1999, the United States hinted and warned a number of times that such a 
course by Pakistan’s military was not acceptable to it. On September 20, 1999, an official was quoted as saying 
that the United States would “strongly oppose” any attempt by “political and military actors” in Pakistan to 
overthrow the Sharif government. The official continued, “We hope there will be no return to the days of 
interrupted democracy in Pakistan…We would strongly oppose any attempt to change the government through 
extra-constitutional means.”49 The military did not listen to the warning, as subsequent events proved. Though 
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the statement was not liked inside Pakistan50 there was a general belief that the United States would come to the 
rescue of Sharif, in case of any threat to his rule.51 It is believed that the United States also advised Sharif 
against removing Pervez Musharraf, when Shabaz Sharif visited the United States during the third week of 
September. During the visit, Shabaz Sharif met with Strobe Talbott, Bruce Riedel, and Karl Inderfurth.52 
 
Table 3.1: US Pressure on Pakistan 
 
Date/Desired Outcome Means of Pressure Impact/Result 
May 1999 
Preventing Pakistan from 
going nuclear 
Clinton spoke to Sharif; sent Inderfurth, 
Riedel, and Talbott to pressure Sharif 
into refraining from testing 
Negative 
Sharif went ahead with nuclear 
tests and conducted five tests in 
Chagai 
Sep-Oct 1999 
Preventing Pakistan army 
from taking over 
Issued a general warning against the take 
over; also informed Sharif not to make 
the situation unstable by removing the 
COAS 
Negative 
Musharraf took over power 
Post Sep 11, 2001 
Pursuing Osama bin Laden 
and the Taliban in 
Afghanistan 
To allow the United States to use 
Pakistan as a base; to force Pakistan to 
give up its support for Taliban and to 
share intelligence about Osama 
Positive 
The military regime provided all 
the required support 
Ongoing 
Curbing militancy in 
Kashmir 





Under pressure from India, the United States attempted to convince Pakistan to refrain from supporting the 
militants in Jammu and Kashmir. Nancy Powell, the US Ambassador to Pakistan, went on record saying that 
Pakistan should prevent the militants from using its territory to cross over to the LoC and fight the Indian troops 
in Kashmir.53 There have been attempts from the United States since the days of Benazir Bhutto to pressure 
Pakistan from supporting the militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. 
US influence on Pakistan is limited and at times even non-existent. Especially in terms of Pakistan’s 
Kashmir policy and its nuclear weapons, no external force, including the United States, is able to pressure 
Pakistan against what it perceive as its interests. Sharif’s visit to the United States in the first week of July 
during the Kargil conflict should not be considered as US influence or pressure to bring the conflict to an end. 
There was more pressure from Sharif on Clinton to bring the conflict to an end than there was US pressure on 
Pakistan. 
On July 4, 1999, Sharif agreed to a pull-back, as he became more worried about the situation getting out of 
his hand and leading to a military takeover. In retrospect, it is evident that Sharif and Musharraf had two 
different views before and during Kargil conflict. According to Riedel, Sharif brought his wife and children to 
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Washington on June 4, 1999, which was a “possible indication that he was afraid he might not be able to go 
home if the summit failed, or that the military was telling him to leave.”54 
The Threat of Massive Retaliation 
There is also a belief that Pakistan will not use its nuclear weapons because it cannot afford a second strike. 
According to George Fernandes, “I can’t believe they would ever use [nuclear weapons] for the simple reason 
that they would be inviting a second strike…[which] could be devastating given Pakistan’s size.”55 Former 
Chief of Air Staff S.K. Sareen told an interviewer that “nuclear weapons are essentially weapons of deterrence, 
i.e. to dissuade the enemy from using nuclear bombs. No nation can contemplate using them against another 
nuclear weapon state, as the retaliation it would invite would be unbearable. For Pakistan to use nuclear 
weapons against India would be suicidal. Pakistan is aware of our superior nuclear capabilities, and any use by 
Pakistan of nuclear weapons would be self-defeating.”56 
 
Table 3.2: Possibilities of Escalating an Indo-Pak Limited War 
 
Assumption Possibility Remarks/Questions 
Nuclear umbrella 
provides space for 
limited war with 
Pakistan 
Perhaps Depends on Indian definition of limited war and the area of 
operations and its duration 
Political, economic and 
human costs of 
enlargement would limit 
the war 
Unlikely Political costs of losing a limited war may force the government 
and military in Pakistan to expand 
 
Even the Indian government may be forced to expand, if the 
limited war does not go in its favor 
Indian awareness of the 
Pakistani redline would 
make the former not 
push too far 
Perhaps What if the Pakistani military decides to escalate like that of 
India in 1965 and 1971? 
 
What about the Indian redline? 
US pressure on Pakistan 
will prevent the latter 
from expanding the 
conflict 
Unlikely The US pressure on Pakistan vis-à-vis India is inadequate, if not 
non-existent (e.g., Pakistan’s nuclear tests, Pak support for 
militancy in Kashmir) 
The fear of massive 
Indian retaliation will 
prevent Pakistan from 
exploring the nuclear 
option 
 
Perhaps Depends on Pakistan’s conviction regarding India’s massive 
retaliation capacity 
 
Are the Indians convinced of their massive retaliation capacity? 
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Limitations of Indian Limited War: The Threat of Inadvertent or Deliberate Escalation 
The following factors need to be taken into consideration from an Indian perspective in initiating a limited war 
with Pakistan. 
• Internal support and pressure on the Indian political establishment, especially if the limited war is not 
yielding the desired results during the initial period 
• External pressure on India 
• Pakistan’s decision to expand the war  
• Popular support in Pakistan to expand the conflict 
• The threat of use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan and the national and international responses 
• A militant attack in the heartland of India, either on an institution or individuals 
First, how much internal support would be there for India in case it decides to wage a limited war with 
Pakistan? India would need a powerful reason to garner enough support to initiate a limited war with Pakistan. 
In the last few years, there were only a few occasions in which a political sector inside India argued for a severe 
military response to Pakistan. All these occasions were marked by a terrorist attack either inside Kashmir or 
elsewhere in India. 
The level of internal support crucial in any limited war scenario depends on other factors. First, it would 
depend on the level of parliamentary support that the government enjoys. Even if the government enjoys 
majority support in the Parliament, support from opposition parties would be vital in any war scenario. In 
general, the opposition parties have always been supportive of the governments during any external aggressions. 
But how much support would be there from the opposition, if India is likely to initiate an aggression? Second, 
the level of internal support is also determined by achievements on the battlefield. If the Indian offensive is 
productive in terms of destroying the militant camps or keeping the Pakistan army on the defensive, then the 
level of internal support is likely to increase. On the contrary, if an Indian offensive failed to achieve its 
objective in the initial days and weeks or the Indian security forces are subjected to heavy casualties, internal 
support is likely to diminish. In Kargil, internal support was widespread, as Indian forces were fighting to repel 
an invasion and against external aggression.  
The second factor that would constrain an Indian limited war scenario would be the level of external 
support. How much external support would India be able to garner during a limited war? The first response 
from the international community would be that of condemning Indian actions if it violated the LoC. External 
pressure would be exerted in various forms. First, the international community led by the United States would 
pressure India to call for a ceasefire immediately and halt military operations. Major states would also send 
emissaries to defuse the situation and call for India to withdraw its forces to its side of the LoC. If the Kargil 
conflict is to be taken as an example, the international community refused to agree with Pakistan and supported 
India, as the invasion was perceived as a case of Pakistani aggression.  
The third factor that would be the most crucial in constraining India’s objectives and actions in a limited 
war situation would be Pakistan’s response. What if Pakistan decides to expand the war? After all, why should 
Pakistan limit the war, if it is not in its interests? In the event of Indian limited war across the LoC opposite to 
either the Baramulla or Rajouri and Poonch sectors, and India is able to thrust forward, how would Pakistan 
respond? Would Pakistan fight only in these sectors? Will Pakistan use only its army and paramilitary forces or 
would it also use its air force? 
During the Kargil conflict, India decided to fight on its side of the LoC, as Pakistan convinced India and the 
international community in the initial period that the infiltrators were only mujahideen. Since Pakistan never 
admitted the involvement of its troops and India was not certain in the initial period about the background of the 
infiltrators, India’s efforts were mainly aimed at removing the infiltrators and not at crossing the LoC. India 
withstood the pressure to cross over. Will Pakistan also pursue the same strategy if India decides to execute a 
Kargil-like operation on the other side of the LoC?  
Unlike Pakistan, India would not be able to claim that the infiltrators across the LoC are not from its armed 
forces. Right from day one, there would be open hostilities between Indian and Pakistani forces. Pakistan’s 
strategy then would be aimed at removing the Indian forces from “its soil” and not removing so-called “Indian 
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infiltrators.” Hence, it is unlikely that the Pakistani response would have the limitations that India had during 
the Kargil conflict. 
Why would Pakistan limit its response, if an Indian limited war is not in its favor? Pakistan would be 
tempted to expand the war for the following reasons. First, it would increase the pressure on India politically, on 
whether or not it was fighting a “limited” war. Instead of responding only to the Indian infiltration in select 
sectors, Pakistan may attempt to increase the areas of conflict from Jammu to Kargil. How then would India 
respond, as the limited war is expanding? Would India stick to its original plan of a limited war in a limited 
area? The first reason for Pakistan to expand the war would be to increase the political pressure on India.  
Second, Pakistan would be tempted to expand the limited war to increase pressure on India militarily. India 
then would be forced to fight all along the LoC, depending on whether Pakistan likes to expand the war only 
along the LoC or even along the international border in the Jammu sectors. An increased scope of military 
activity would deny an immediate outcome, thus negating any initial success of Indian forces in Pakistan-
occupied Kashmir.  
Third, Pakistan would also be tempted to expand the conflict because of internal political factors. Pakistani 
armed forces are well aware that any military defeat at the hands of Indian forces would be politically disastrous 
for its internal influence. Rather than being bogged down in a select area, Pakistan would likely confront the 
Indian forces, bringing about a military stalemate. The Pakistan army is also well aware that in case of an open 
military conflict, neither side can emerge victorious in the short run. A military stalemate at a larger level would 
then definitely be a better option for Pakistani forces, irrespective of high casualties, than a military defeat in a 
limited conflict with lesser casualties. Even an economic breakdown due to a larger conflict would be 
acceptable to Pakistan’s military, rather than the maintenance of a stable economy in a limited conflict. What 
would ultimately matter for Pakistan’s security forces would be its prestige and its position inside Pakistan. 
Fourth, Pakistan would also be tempted to expand the conflict for external factors. Any expansion of the 
conflict is bound to increase the international anxiety over an Indo-Pak nuclear war. The longer and broader the 
conflict in terms of time and territory, the more the international community, led by the United States, is bound 
to increase its pressure. Any such international pressure, as seen in the previous incidents, is bound only to 
reassert the status quo. Pakistan’s decision to expand the war would be aimed at increasing the international 
pressure on India to withdraw its forces to their pre-conflict positions.  
If Pakistan decides to expand the conflict, how would it pursue that option? It would obviously use its air 
force on both sides of the LoC. Would it use nuclear weapons? As seen in the previous chapters, there have 
been a number of threats from Pakistan on its resolve to use nuclear weapons during a conflict. Would Pakistan 
really use nuclear weapons if it is facing defeat in a limited war situation? 
Two important questions need to be raised in a hypothetical situation. One, what if Pakistan, facing the 
threat of losing a limited war, decides to use nuclear weapons against one or more targets inside India? Two, 
what if Pakistan, after failing to stop the Indian military offensive, decides to use nuclear weapons inside its 
territory, but against the advancing Indian troops? 
Another important factor that could limit the initial Indian objectives of a limited war would be a militant 
attack in the Indian heartland. During a limited war scenario, how would India respond if there is a militant 
attack, either on a personality of high political value or on a symbol of what India stands for? What if the 
militants succeed in attacking the prime minister, home minister, or the defense minister? What if the militants 
succeed in carrying out another attack on the Parliament similar to the one on December 13, 2001? What if the 
militants succeed in carrying an attack like that of Kaluchak? Would India then still contemplate a limited 
conflict or would it be pressured to escalate the conflict? 
To conclude, the question is whether or not there is sufficient space for India to wage a limited war with 
Pakistan. However, a more important query is whether or not such a limited war will secure India’s interests 
vis-à-vis Pakistan. Irrespective of the space under the nuclear umbrella, if a limited war does not secure India’s 
political interests, then such an option need not be pursued. On the other hand, if exercising the limited war 
option secures India’s political interests, then India should attempt exploring such a space. Therefore, the 
crucial question is: would a limited war secure India’s political interests vis-à-vis Pakistan in general and 





Will a Limited War Secure Indian Interests? 
Looking for Objectives—Limited or Unlimited? 
Any war, whether limited or not, should be based on certain objectives, which are either political or military or 
both. What could be India’s political and military objectives in waging a limited war? By definition, limited 
wars are fought for political objectives, in which the armed forces are to carry out the objectives spelt out by the 
political leadership.1 First, what could the political objectives of India be, if it decides to wage a limited war?2  
It is essential to map Indian political objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan’s, especially with regards to Kashmir. 
Any political or military strategy that the Indian government plans to undertake should be aimed at fulfilling 
these objectives. Any military strategy, whether limited war or unlimited war, conventional or nuclear, pre-
emptive or surgical strikes, should then fit into a larger framework of achieving those political objectives.  
Indian objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan and Kashmir, broadly classified, could be the following at national, 
bilateral, and international levels. 
• To get back the territory that Pakistan has been occupying since the First Indo-Pak War in 1948.  
• To convert the LoC into a permanent border and to force Pakistan consider this option as a permanent 
solution to the Kashmir dispute.  
• To prevent Pakistan from supporting the separatist and militant movement in Jammu and Kashmir. 
• To combat the militant movement in Jammu and Kashmir and prevent terrorist attacks all over India.  
• To integrate the state of Jammu and Kashmir, especially the people of Kashmir, psychologically into 
the Indian mainstream. 
• To have Pakistan as a stable democracy, where the role of the military is minimized in taking political 
decisions vis-à-vis India. 
• To minimize external involvement in the bilateral issues between India and Pakistan. 
Any Indian strategy should be aimed at fulfilling these primary objectives. Clearly any military strategy 
should then conform to these major political objectives. A military strategy could only be a means to achieve 
these political objectives, irrespective of such a strategy resulting in a gain or loss at the ground level. In other 
words, even if India would lose a military battle, but win the war at the political level, such a military strategy is 
worth pursuing, as long as the results help India to achieve its political objectives. However, a military strategy, 
even if it results in India winning the battle, but ultimately affects its long-term political objectives, is not worth 
pursuing. If political objectives are negatively affected, then any war, limited or unlimited, would prove 
unproductive, despite victory.  
The primary issue then is not winning a battle, but the war. It is essential to analyze the concept of limited 
war with Pakistan in this background. Will a limited war with Pakistan secure India’s interests? The primary 
objective of limited war with Pakistan, then, is not to focus on whether there is a space for conducting such a 
military strategy or whether India could win a limited war. Rather, the focus of any limited war should be aimed 
at whether it would secure India’s interests in Jammu and Kashmir amid the larger issues of Indo-Pak relations. 
No less important is the issue of whether a limited war with Pakistan would secure India’s stability at the 
national level. 
It is worth analyzing what implications a limited war could have on the above-mentioned primary 
objectives of India. 
                                                           
 
1 Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), 
13. 
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56 Suba Chandran 
  
First, would a limited war with Pakistan enable India to get back lost territories in Kashmir? According to 
the Parliamentary Resolution passed on February 22, 1994, the  
State of Jammu and Kashmir has been, is and shall be an integral part of India and any attempts to 
separate it from the rest of the country will be resisted by all necessary means…Pakistan must vacate 
the areas of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, which they have occupied through aggression…3  
This objective exists only at the rhetorical level. India would only be too happy if Pakistan is willing to 
give back those territories that it had occupied in the 1948 war. Today, except for miniscule rightist elements, 
no one in India, either in the government or outside it, considers getting back those lost territories “at any cost.” 
For all practical purposes, the government and the people at large, though they may be hesitant to declare it 
publicly, are aware that those territories are lost forever. They have only a bargaining value for India. In fact, 
the Indian government is willing to convert the existing Line of Control into a permanent border.  
Many inside India are well aware that Pakistan would never return those occupied territories or even 
remove its troops from there. To a large extent, this objective has become defunct. If India has given up this 
objective at the political level, then the question of waging a limited war to win back those territories does not 
exist. Besides, even if India considers this objective seriously and pursues a military option, a limited war would 
simply not be sufficient. Even retired military personnel in India agree that “recapturing PoK [Pakistan-
occupied Kashmir]—a parliamentary military objective—is a pipe dream, least of all when the two armies are 
fully deployed in battle locations and any tactical surprise is ruled out.” 4 
Second, will a limited war enable India to force Pakistan to agree to convert the LoC into an international 
border? India would be willing to settle for this conversion as a final settlement. However, Pakistan has rejected 
this option. For them, the LoC is the problem. And they ask: why should we accept the problem as a solution? 
Would India be able to force Pakistan through a limited war to agree to this conversion? Any armed 
conflict between India and Pakistan across the LoC would immediately attract international attention. The 
presence of nuclear weapons within India and Pakistan has forced and would force the international community 
in the future to freeze any armed incursions immediately. Both during the Kargil conflict and the year-long 
confrontation in 2002, the international community pressured both India and Pakistan to respect the LoC and 
reach an agreement through negotiations. 
Neither Pakistan nor the international community would approve of Indian efforts to convert the LoC into 
an international border through military means. India can effectively achieve this result only through political 
means via negotiations.  
Third, will a limited war reduce Pakistan’s support for militancy in Kashmir? The proponents of the limited 
war thesis believe that limited war with Pakistan could be a major strategy to make Pakistan realize its folly and 
teach it a lesson for supporting militancy in Kashmir. According to this position, a limited war would increase 
the cost for Pakistan supporting militancy besides proving a point that India is sincere and earnest in tackling 
infiltration. It would also send signals to militant groups operating from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir that if they 
continue their activities there would be no safe havens, as India would be willing to target their camps. 
Militancy has been used by Pakistan as a specific strategy to keep the conflict in Kashmir alive. It is highly 
unlikely that Pakistan would be coerced through a limited war to stop its support for militancy. Pakistan is well 
aware that the moment it stops supporting militancy, it would lose its leverage over Kashmir. One main reason 




                                                           
 
3 The Parliamentary Resolution dated February 22, 1994 also states that “India has the will and capacity to firmly counter all 
designs against its unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity; and demands that…all attempts to interfere in the internal 
affairs of India will be met resolutely.” 
4 Ashok K. Mehta, “Shifting Policies Deter Military Resolve,” The Pioneer, January 4, 2003. 
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Table 4.1: Will a Limited War Secure India’s Interests? 
 






No India would need to wage a full conventional war to reclaim 
the territories 
 
It is doubtful that India will be able to hold onto the territory, 
even if it claims it 
Converting the LoC 
into a permanent 
border 
Unlikely The political costs to either the democratic polity or the 
military in Pakistan would be too high 
 
Pakistan would rather risk a full conventional war 
Preventing Pakistan 
from supporting the 
separatist and militant 
movement in Jammu 
and Kashmir  
Unlikely Neither the failure in Kargil, nor the threat of war in 2002 
prevented Pakistan from continuing its support 
Combatting the 
militant movement in 
Jammu and Kashmir 
and preventing 
terrorist attacks all 
over India 
Unlikely The militant attacks would only intensify. Events 
surrounding the Kargil conflict and 2002 border 
confrontation are adequate examples 
Integrating the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir, 
especially the people 
of Kashmir, 
psychologically into 
the Indian mainstream 
Unlikely The Kashmiris were indifferent during the Kargil conflict 
 
No support, political or popular, could be expected from 
Kashmir during any limited war with Pakistan 
Having a stable and 
democratic Pakistan 
where the role of the 
military is minimized 
in taking political 
decisions vis-à-vis 
India 
Unlikely Any armed conflict with Pakistan would only increase the 





between India and 
Pakistan, especially 
over Kashmir 
Unlikely Pakistan would only emphasize that Kashmir is an 
“international” issue and a “nuclear flashpoint” 
 
Fourth, will a limited war reduce militancy in Kashmir? If Kargil is to be taken as a limited conflict, then 
did it reduce militancy in Kashmir? If the argument could be widened, would a military option with Pakistan 
reduce militancy in Kashmir? If militant attacks could be graphed for the last decade, it would be clear that 
militancy in fact has increased since the Kargil conflict. 
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Militant Attacks in Kashmir before and after Kargil Conflict 
The following tables illustrate the rising frequency of militant attacks in relation to the Kargil conflict.5 
 
Table 4.2: Militant Attacks on Security Forces 
 
Year Killed Year Killed 
1993 216 1999 555 
1994 236 2000 638 
1995 297 2001 590 
1996 376 2002 469 
1997 355 2003 338 
1998 339   
 
Table 4.3: Attacks on Minority Communities since 1998 
 
District No. of 
Attacks 
If casualties, numbers killed in 
each attack 
Total 
Udhampur 5 9,4,5,7,8,3 36 
Doda 17 26,15,20,29,13,4,5,6,5,5,15 141 
Rajori  10 11,9,3,12,10,5,4 54 
Poonch 4 9,5,2,6 22 
Anantnag  4 15,7,13,2 37 
Pahalgam 3 23,5,8 36 
Jammu 4 13,30,28,13 84 
Pulawama 1 24 24 
Anantnag 4 15,7,13,2 37 
 
Table 4.4: Attacks on Political Activists 
 
Year Killed Year Killed 
1993 0 1999 53 
1994 8 2000 30 
1995 16 2001 49 
1996 75 2002 87 
1997 52 2003 31 
1998 30   
 
The three tables on militant attacks above reveal that militancy in Kashmir has been revived after the Kargil 
conflict. In fact, the militant attacks have intensified in the form of fidayeen attacks. A difference needs to be 
made between the fidayeen attacks and suicide attacks, though the media and the militants refer to the fidayeen 
                                                           
5 Data compiled through various sources, including reports that appeared in newspapers, South Asia Terrorism Portal 
(http://www.satp.org), and the Indian army’s website (http://www.armyinkashmir.org). 
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attacks as suicide attacks, most likely because doing so gives them more publicity.6 Fidayeen attacks, however, 
are hit and run attempts and do not use suicide bombs. The fidayeen attacks are daring raids on military camps 
by a group of militants. They represent a post-Kargil conflict phenomenon in that they have been increasing 
noticeably since that time.  
 
Table 4.5: Fidayeen Attacks since the Kargil Conflict 
 
22 July 2003 A fidayeen squad attacked an army camp in Akhnoor, killing eight security forces 
including a brigadier 
28 June 2003 A fidayeen squad attacked an army installation in Sunjwan, killing 12 soldiers 
26 April 2003 A fidayeen squad attacked the All India Radio Station in Srinagar, killing two 
security forces  
25 April 2003 A two-member fidayeen squad attacked a BSF headquarters at Madar, killing three 
BSF personnel 
14 March 2003 A deputy superintendent of police along with three civilians were killed in Poonch 
19 December 2002 One security force personnel was killed and three injured in a fidayeen attack at 
Khablan village, Thana Mandi 
24 November 2002 13 civilans were killed by a two-member fidayeen squad in two shrines––Raghunath 
and Panjbakhtar temples––in Jammu 
21 September 2002 A police personnel was killed in Srinagar in a fidayeen attack 
14 May 2002 36 persons were killed by a fidayeen squad in an attack on the army cantonment in 
Kaluchak 
30 March 2002 Three security forces personnel were killed by a two-member fidayeen attack in 
Jammu 
8 December 2001 A two-member fidayeen squad killed a security force personnel at Azad Kunj 
 
22 October 2001 A four-member fidayeen squad was killed after they attacked an IAF station at 
Avantipur 
1 October 2001 36 persons were killed in a fidayeen attack on the State Legislative Assembly 
complex 
17 September 2001 A two-member fidayeen squad killed nine security forces personnel in Handwara 
7 August 2001 Two security forces personnel and seven civilians were killed in a fidayeen attack at 
the Jammu railway station. 
9 February 2001 A four-member fidayeen squad attacked the police control room in Srinagar 
16 January 2001 Four security forces personnel were killed in a fidayeen attack on Srinagar Airport 
 
The Kargil conflict has not only revived militancy in Kashmir, but has also intensified it. Will a limited war 
initiated by India then be able to reduce militancy in Kashmir? 
                                                           
6 Suba Chandran, “Fighting the Fidayeens: Combating Suicide Terrorism in Kashmir,” in Terrorism Post 9/11: An Indian 
Perspective, eds. P.R. Chari and Suba Chandran (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2003), 136-138. 
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Fifth, will a limited war with Pakistan result in the Kashmiris supporting the Indian side? It is unlikely. 
During the Kargil conflict, there was not much local support for India’s war efforts in Kashmir. The Kashmiris 
considered the Kargil conflict as “India’s War” and not theirs. The general euphoria that was found in other 
parts of the country was strangely lacking in the Kashmir Valley. Some of the Kashmiris were “even glad to see 
the Indian troops on the defensive.”7 According to a local college student in Srinagar, “It [Kargil conflict] is 
good, these people [Indian security forces] should know what a real war means. It is easy to stop civilian 
passenger buses and ask us to come down and frisk and humiliate our womenfolk. Let them get a beating.”8 A 
section in Kashmir in fact welcomed the Kargil conflict as “the conflict brought temporary relief to a region that 
had been bowed under the heavy presence of Indian troops for years. Redeploying many of these troops to 
Kargil meant less crackdown operations, less checkpoints, and less army movements in many villages and 
towns.”9 
Muzamil Jaleel summed up the feeling inside Kashmir over Kargil: 
The Kargil war was fought, won and lost. Both India and Pakistan claimed victory, amid jingoism and 
nationalistic fervour. But in Kashmir both sides seem to have lost. The war on the barren mountains of 
Kargil has exposed both India and Pakistan in the Valley. For those Kashmiris who believed in 
“Kashmir to Kanyakumari is one,” many queries arise. Why was this sympathy wave missing when 
Kashmiris were being killed for the past ten years? Why was there no newspaper advertisement to 
collect donations for victims of violence in Kashmir? Why was there no outpouring of nationalistic 
fervour even when fifty civilians were killed on a Srinagar street?10 
Sixth, will a limited war reduce the influence of the military and establish a stable democracy in Pakistan? 
A stable and democratic Pakistan is clearly in the interests of India. A limited war, as happened in Kargil, would 
only strengthen the status and power of the military in Pakistan’s power equations. It is evident that in any 
limited war scenario Pakistani forces cannot be decimated to the extent it happened during the 1971 Indo-Pak 
War.  
In the 1971 war, the Pakistani forces faced an ignominious defeat, which witnessed them surrendering to 
the Indian forces; thousands of Pakistani soldiers taken as prisoners of war; and ultimately East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh) breaking away and emerging as an independent nation. In the immediate aftermath of the 1971 
war, the armed forces of Pakistan lost their status and prestige inside Pakistan for the first time since the 1947 
independence. The military’s defeat at the hands of India and its inability to protect the territorial integrity of 
Pakistan also reduced their influence over its polity, at least for a temporary period. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
succeeded in shadowing the political power and influence of the armed forces for a couple of years. The armed 
forces were thoroughly demoralized and dared not influence the initial political events following the 1971 war. 
Had they attempted, the people of Pakistan would have risen up against their armed forces, so much was the 
hatred and dissatisfaction of the former towards the latter at the time. 
Unless Pakistan’s armed forces were defeated at that level, it is highly unlikely that they would lose their 
influence in national politics. Any limited war with Pakistan is unlikely to create that situation for its armed 
forces. On the contrary, a limited war would only strengthen the hold of the military over Pakistan’s politics and 
society.  
What if India succeeds in a limited war scenario and is able to reach the militant camps in PoK and destroy 
them? What if the Pakistani armed forces lose a significant area in PoK to the Indian forces in a limited war 
situation? Presuming that India succeeds in occupying an area, forcing hundreds of Pakistani soldiers to 
surrender and be taken as prisoners of war, and Pakistani forces are unable to remove the Indian forces, what 
are the likely outcomes? Would they secure India’s security interests? 
First, Pakistan would attempt to restore the status quo by forcing the Indian forces to retreat. It would 
concentrate mainly in those sectors that Indian troops occupy. Like India during the Kargil conflict, Pakistan is 
also sure to rule out any negotiations as long as Indian forces remain deployed across the LoC. Even if India is 
                                                           
7 Muzamil Jaleel, “It Was Not Our War,” in Guns and Yellow Roses: Essays on the Kargil War (New Delhi: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1999), 65. 
8 A local college student in Srinagar quoted in Jaleel, “It Was Not Our War,” 65. 
9 Jaleel, “It Was Not Our War,” 72. 
10 Ibid., 93. 
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willing to negotiate a cease-fire, Pakistan would refuse that option until it is able to regain the lost positions. 
The people of Pakistan are sure to back such an option. In that case, the armed forces of Pakistan are bound to 
be portrayed by its people as the defenders of their country’s territory and as heroes who withstood Indian 
aggression. 
Another outcome also needs to be taken into account in a scenario where the Indian forces occupy a section 
in PoK and take considerable numbers of prisoners of war. What if the fundamentalist forces, including jihadi 
groups, take over Pakistan’s polity? Can such a situation be completely ruled out? With the armed forces 
defeated and the secular democratic forces not able to recoup, the possibility of fundamentalist forces filling the 
power vacuum remains.  
The religious parties have succeeded in filling up the vacuum created by the poor performance of moderate 
parties in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province. While the religious parties never had much 
influence in the main province—Punjab—jihadi and sectarian forces mainly emanate from there. If the jihadi 
forces and the religious parties come together overtly, such an alliance would pose a serious threat to Pakistan 
in a crisis situation in which the Pakistani forces are bogged down along the border. 
In either of these cases, even India winning a limited conflict would not serve its security interests in the 
long run. In the first scenario, which is most likely, the popular support for the armed forces inside Pakistan is 
bound to be reinforced and increased. In the second case, though unlikely, Pakistan is bound to become an 
unstable and fundamentalist country, which then would become an epicenter of jihad, exporting its brand of 
Islam. In such an event, the initial Indian objective of attacking militant camps through a limited war would 
only backfire. 
Clearly, irrespective of the existence of a political space to conduct a limited war, any such military 
adventure would not achieve much in support of India’s interests. A limited war would not bring the PoK back 
to the Indian fold; a limited war would not force Pakistan to agree to convert the LoC into an international 
border; a limited war would not prevent militancy in Jammu and Kashmir; a limited war would not remove the 
alienation inside Kashmir and integrate the population into the mainstream; a limited war would not undermine 
the influence of the military in Pakistani politics; and a limited war would not bring any international support 
for India’s stand on Kashmir. 
Is There an Alternative Strategy to Secure Indian Interests? 
If limited war will not achieve India’s interests, then is there an alternative strategy that would achieve India’s 
interests in Kashmir? As seen in the second chapter, limited war arose in India as an alternative strategy because 
earlier attempts failed to achieve anything substantial.  
India’s strategies all along have been to reach an understanding on Kashmir at the New Delhi-Islamabad 
level. What India has failed to understand is that since the 1980s, a majority of Kashmiris are not supportive of 
India and there does exist alienation and a sense of deprivation—both actual and imagined—amongst the 
Kashmiris. Bad governance and narrow politics by successive governments have completely distanced Srinagar 
from New Delhi. Islamabad has been successful in exploiting this distance between New Delhi and Srinagar, 
particularly concentrating on the political frustration amongst Kashmiris and the continuous bad governance of 
the state. Had it not been for bad governance, alienation, and deteriorating New Delhi-Srinagar relations, 
Pakistan would have never succeeded in abetting militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi provided the 
causes and Islamabad only exploited them. 
If India is to address Pakistan, then it has to be based on a long-term strategy aimed at improving the 
relations between New Delhi and Srinagar; providing better governance; and removing the feeling of alienation 
amongst the Kashmiris. The road to Islamabad for New Delhi runs through Srinagar, and unless the ride is 
smooth, India will never be able to reach Pakistan. 
An improved New Delhi-Srinagar relationship would considerably reduce the level of militancy in Jammu 
and Kashmir. In the long run, positive relations can undermine conditions that foster militancy, as happened in 
Punjab. At least the situation could be brought back to its pre-1987 level. Once the level of militancy is reduced 
and relations between Srinagar and New Delhi improve, Pakistan’s hold over Kashmir would start withering 
away. Obviously, there would still be a group inside Jammu and Kashmir demanding independence or who may 
owe allegiance to Pakistan, but they would not have any real support at the ground level. Pakistan would still 
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talk about its “political” support to the freedom movement in Kashmir, but there would be no takers in Kashmir 
or for that matter even inside Pakistan. 
Political leadership inside Kashmir, both moderate and separatist, is aware that an independent Kashmir is 
nothing but a dream. Abdul Ghani Bhat, former Chairman of the Hurriyat Conference, said in a 2003 interview:  
In my honest view, independent Kashmir is not a workable idea. Indians don’t accept it, Pakistanis too 
more importantly. China may also not choose to accept it. The reasons are not far to seek, and are as 
obvious as anything. Maybe all three do not accept it and therefore, Kashmir doesn’t go independent.11  
Most of the Kashmiris, especially in rural areas, demand employment, electricity, water, and freedom from 
harassment by the security forces. Azadi (independence) as a demand comes in only fifth in the ranking of 
concerns for people in rural areas. The azadi demand comes first, with the rest later, only among the people of 
Srinagar.  
In the recent past, New Delhi has taken considerable steps, which need to be further strengthened. For the 
first time in decades, New Delhi succeeded in organizing free and fair elections for the legislative assembly of 
Jammu and Kashmir. While there have been minor criticisms of the elections held in 2002, they were accepted 
as free and fair by most inside and outside India. The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) formed a government 
with support from the Congress Party and other parties. The government led by the PDP is seen as independent 
by many inside Kashmir, as for the first time the state is being ruled by a non-National Conference (NC) 
government. The NC has always been seen as the stooge of the Union government. 
Second, Vajpayee addressed the Kashmiris and initiated a new process in April 2003 to build the 
relationship between New Delhi and Srinagar. N.N. Vohra has been appointed as the Union government’s chief 
interlocutor to speak to Kashmiris. Though many Kashmiris are critical about Vohra’s initiative, the response to 
it has been positive in terms of conveying what the Kashmiris want.12  
Third, New Delhi has also initiated a dialogue at the highest level between the separatist groups—led by 
the Hurriyat and the Union home minister. The first round of talks took place in February 2004 and the second 
round in April 2004. 
Fourth, India has also initiated a new dialogue process with Pakistan starting in October 2003. The 
Islamabad summit and the follow-up joint statement between Vajpayee and Musharraf initiated a new process at 
the bilateral level between India and Pakistan.  
Fifth, there seems to be an open rift between the militant groups and their erstwhile masters—a section 
inside the Pakistani army. The militant and jihadi groups seem to have become independent and are even 
retaliating against the Pakistani army. Two assassination attempts were made on General Musharraf in 
December 2003. 
New Delhi should recognize these changing conditions and initiate a new process aimed at bringing the 
Kashmiris closer to the Indian mainstream.  
First, it is imperative that New Delhi devolves an element of autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. For 
example, New Delhi could change the nomenclature of the head of the state to Wazir-e-Azam and Sadar-i-
Riyasat for State Executive. The state of Jammu and Kashmir could be provided a significant role in selecting 
its governor. According to the Independent Study Team for the Delhi Policy Group: 
The Governor could be elected by the State legislature and appointed by the President and by virtue of 
Article 156 (1) hold office at the pleasure of the President; or the State government could submit a 
panel of names and the President would appoint as Governor the person he finds most suitable from 
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the panel, and he would hold office at the President’s pleasure; or the President would submit a name 
which the legislature might endorse. The President could then appoint the governor and the latter 
would hold office at his pleasure.13 
Second, India needs to improve its human rights record and also dispel some myths regarding human rights 
violations. Many inside Kashmir support militancy due to the harassment from security forces. While an 
element of human rights violations is sometimes unavoidable in a conflict situation, the fact that Indian forces 
could improve their track record is undeniable. Though there is no need for an external monitoring of human 
rights conditions in Jammu and Kashmir, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) should be given full 
powers to monitor the situation.14 
Third, India could constitute a commission on the disappeared. It has been reported by Mushtaq Ahmad 
Lone, former home minister of Jammu and Kashmir in the state legislative assembly in 1999, that the 
government is aware of 3,257 people who have gone missing ever since the violence escalated in Kashmir.15 
Current chief minister of the state, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, also reported in the state legislative assembly that 
3,741 have disappeared since 2000.16 Independent accounts estimate that the figure could be as high as 6,000.17 
A committee on disappearances on the models of Truth and Reconcilation Committees of South Africa 
would go a long way in redefining the faith of people in government institutions. Such a commission would also 
prove to be beneficial to the state in addressing many false accusations of these disappearances.  
Fourth, India should take adequate measures to address the conditions of the victims of the conflicts, 
especially that of widows, “half-widows,” and orphans. According to independent estimates, there are roughly 
around 10,000 to 50,000 widows in the Valley.18 Besides the widows, there are a number of “half widows” in 
the Valley, whose husbands have either crossed over to Pakistan or were killed by the security forces, but their 
identity has not been established or they have simply disappeared. Besides widows and half widows, according 
to independent estimates there are around 35,000-40,000 orphans in Kashmir.19  
Fifth, the Union government should initiate a serious dialogue with the entire spectrum of Kashmiris, 
including that of the Hurriyat Conference. A dialogue with the Hurriyat is essential because it occupies a certain 
political space, minimizing the space for the militants.  
A marginalized and divided Hurriyat will not be in the interest of India, at least, until the democratic 
process in the Valley is re-established. Such a marginalization of the Hurriyat would in effect reduce 
the significant political space that presently it is occupying, and would increase the space for militancy. 
In fact the Hurriyat to an extent has been resisting the space for the militants. It has been against the 
militants calling for hartals. In fact, to an extent the hartals organized by the Hurriyat have been acting 
as a vent for the public in Kashmir to express their dissatisfaction and anger against the government. 
To an extent, the Hurriyat act as the safety-valve and it is in the government’s interest that the Hurriyat 
continue to occupy this space.20 
India’s efforts in Jammu and Kashmir thus should be aimed at reducing the space between New Delhi and 
Srinagar. Such an effort would automatically also reduce Pakistan’s space in Jammu and Kashmir. In such an 
eventuality Pakistan would have two options. First, it could attempt to increase the level of militancy in the 
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Kashmir valley, thereby negating any advantage that India might accrue due to the reduced space between New 
Delhi and Srinagar. Or Pakistan could attempt to reach a political compromise with India, before it loses all its 
leverage vis-à-vis Jammu and Kashmir. While the Indian security forces have the ability to meet the situation if 
Pakistan decides to opt for the first option, India would have no problem in politically engaging Pakistan if the 
latter decides to pursue the second option. 
To conclude, what is essential for India is to win the political objectives vis-à-vis Kashmir and Pakistan. 
Any military strategy should be aimed at fulfilling these political objectives. If a given military strategy, 
irrespective of winning or losing, is to result in India achieving these political objectives, then such an option is 
worth pursuing. In fact, India should carry out a military option in that case. On the contrary, if a military 
strategy will backfire on India’s long-term political objectives, irrespective of India gaining at the battleground 
militarily, then such an option is not worth pursuing. 
Limited war as a military option is unlikely to gain any significant political objectives in the present 
situation. In that case, irrespective of the political space needed to conduct a limited war and irrespective of 
India making gains in the battle, it may not secure India’s long-term security interests. The primary question 
then should not be whether or not there exists a space to conduct a limited war under a nuclear umbrella; rather, 
it should be whether a limited war would secure India’s interests in Kashmir and vis-à-vis Pakistan. Clearly, 
India should aim at winning the war at the political level and not the battle at the military level. 
